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*The cover: A print by Toyokuni of the actor Iwagawa Jirokichi wearing a kimono with a go pattern.
Collection of Tanaka Fumio.*

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Go World News

Takemiya Defends Honinbo Title

Takemiya has finally shed his reputation of not being able to defend his titles. He was the only player to have won one of the top three titles three times non-consecutively, but this year he showed a new determination to hang on to his seat of honour in the ranks of the title-holders. The unlucky player on the receiving end was Yamashiro Hiroshi, who was only able to win one game in his first challenge for a major title. However, the series was closer than the score might indicate; it actually featured some very exciting and closely fought struggles. We look forward to presenting the games in our next issue.

The results:

Game 1 (14, 15 May). Takemiya (W) won by 4½ points. Game 2 (28, 29 May). Yamashiro (W) won by 2½ points.

Game 3 (5, 6, June). Takemiya (W) won by resig.


Game 4 (18, 19 June). Takemiya (B) won by resig.

Game 5 (25, 26 June). Takemiya (W) won by resig.

Takemiya Still Leads Meijin League

Takemiya has extended his lead in the Meijin league and is now two wins ahead of the field. The worst that could happen to him is to be forced into a playoff, while all he has to do to become the undisputed challenger is to win one more game. He faces tough opponents in Rin and Cho, but he is brimful of confidence and is looking forward to vindicating himself in the Meijin title match for his poor showing in the Judan title match. At the Kisei award ceremony, he boldly predicted that 'this time we should see the correct result.' Takemiya's self-confidence is so frank and open that his frequently provocative statements don't offend anyone, but Kobayashi will undoubtedly throw some tough obstacles in the way of his fulfilling his prediction. Whatever happens, the go world is revolving around Kobayashi and Takemiya for the second year in a row.

After his bad start, Otake seemed to give up and has already lost his place in the league.



Takemiya goes into the lead by winning the third game in the Honinbo title match. Yamashiro's defeat in this match means that we are still waiting for a top player to emerge from the post-Cho generation. Yamashiro also disappointed the expectations of the Nagoya branch of the Nihon Ki-in: he was the first player from there to challenge for a major title (i. e. a best of seven) since his teacher Shimamura unsuccessfully challenged Takagawa for the Honinbo title in 1956.

11th Meijin League (as of 30 June 1986)

Rank	Player	C	O	K	I	R	T.S.	T	Y	O	Score
1	Cho Chikun	—	1	1	0	0	1			1	4 — 2
2	Otake	0	—	0		0	0	0	0	1	1 — 6
3	Kato	0	1	—	1		1	0	1		4 — 2
4	Ishida A.	1		0	—	1		0	1	1	4 — 2
5	Rin Kaiho	1	1		0	—	0		0	1	3 — 3
6	Takagi S.	0	1	0		1	—	0	0	0	2 — 5
7	Takemiya		1	1	1		1	—	1	1	6 — 0
7	Yamashiro		1	0	0	1	1	0	—		3 — 3
7	O Meien	0	0		0	0	1	0		—	1 — 5

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

Cho to Challenge for Gosei Title

Otake's demotion from the Meijin league is not his only problem, for his most dangerous opponent, Cho Chikun, has emerged as the challenger for the 11th Gosei title. Otake has virtually made this title his personal property, but on the other hand he has only won two out of nine title matches against Cho.

Cho's recovery from his injuries in January is proceeding satisfactorily. He now gets around with a walking stick and can walk short distances unaided. He has been in good form and has not gone into any kind of slump since he lost the Kisei title. To become the Gosei challenger, he defeated the Kansai Ki-in players Honda Kuniyoshi in the semifinal and Sonoda Yuichi in the final (12 June).

Touring Chinese Team Defeats Japan

Yet more evidence has been provided that Chinese go is becoming a real threat to Japanese domination of the game. In the 14th Japan-China Go Exchange, a Chinese team toured Japan from 27 April to 18 May and scored 31 wins to 25 losses in seven matches against Japanese teams. The Japanese only salvaged their honour by scoring an 8—8 tie in the best-of-three individual matches that have been a feature of these tours since 1984.

The Chinese results are all the more remarkable for the fact that they were achieved in spite of below-average performances by their top two players, Nie and Ma. Nie lost his best-of-three against Kato 1—2 and also lost to Takemiya, but finished the tour with 4—3. Ma

had the same 3—4 score as on his previous tour of Japan. The star of the Chinese side was Wang Qun, the 1984 world amateur go champion, who scored 6—1. Shao Zhenzhong, the 1981 world amateur champion, had the next best results, scoring 5—2. The two women players on the team, Kong Shangming and Rui Naiwei, scored 3—4 and 4—3 respectively.

The cumulative score for the fourteen tours to date is 385 wins to 370 losses for Japan (plus 20 jigos and 2 no-results). The first series was won 40—14—2 jigos by Japan, but at this rate it will only be a couple of years before the Chinese take the lead.


Go World plans to present a complete report on the tour in a later issue.

Japan and China Tied in 2nd NEC Super Go

Japan can take some consolation for its loss in the Go Exchange from the fact that it has made a better start than last year in the NEC Japan-China Super Go series. After the first two Japanese players lost, Imamura Toshiya 7-dan of the Kansai Ki-in evened the score by defeating the two Chinese women players Rui Naiwei 7-dan and Zhang Xuan 6-dan. Imamura then lost to Qian 7-dan, but Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan defeated him to even the score again. This seesaw struggle is quite a contrast to the first series.

Chan of Hong Kong Wins 8th WAGC

For only the second time in eight tournaments, China has failed to win the World Amateur Go Championship, but even so the winner, Chan Ka Yui of Hong Kong, is a former Chinese player who



Ivan Detkov

represented China twice in the championship before emigrating to Hong Kong. For Chan it was fourth time lucky, as after two second-place and one third-place finishes he finally achieved the goal he has been aiming at ever since he came 2nd in the 2nd WAGC. For Japan it was yet another frustrating result: in his third appearance in the championship, Kikuchi Yasuro, the top Japanese amateur player, finally managed to defeat the Chinese representative only to be denied victory because of Chan's superior SOS (sum of opponent's scores). Kikuchi and Chan both finished on 7 points (Kikuchi lost to Chan and Chan lost to Song of China), but Chan's SOS was 43 and Kikuchi's 42.

This was, of course, the first time that SOS decided the top place, as it was the first time that no one finished with a perfect record. (It was also the first time that no player lost all his games.)

The highlight of the tournament was the first appearance of a U.S.S.R. player. Ivan Detkov, the 1985 Russian Republic Champion, performed creditably to take 15th place. He started out well by defeating a former European Champion, Wolfgang Isele of West Germany, in the first round, but later suffered losses to Kim of South Korea, Ron Snyder of the U.S.A., Rade Petrovic of Yugoslavia, and Frederic Donzet of France, to hold him to a score of four points. His participation in the tournament generated a great amount of publicity, and the sponsors hope that it will further stimulate the popularization of go in the U.S.S.R.

Belgium and Luxembourg also participated

for the first time, creating a new record of 34 countries competing. The Luxembourg player, the 18-year-old Laurent Heiser, was a bit of a dark horse; he showed that his nominal 3-dan rating needs to be revised by scoring impressive victories against Donzet of France and Danek of Czechoslovakia.

The top places are given below. The best performance by a westerner was that of Janusz Kraszek of Poland, who took 6th place. He tied with Ronald Schlemper of Holland in both score and SOS and SODOS (sum of defeated opponent's scores) but took precedence because he won their encounter in the third round.

1. Chan Ka Yui (Hong Kong) 7-1
2. Kikuchi Yasuro (Japan) 7-1
3. Song Xuelin (China) 6-2
4. Kim Chul-jung (Korea) 6-2
5. Chern Mirng-Jihn (Chinese Taipei) 5-3
6. Janusz Kraszek (Poland) 5-3
7. Ronald Schlemper (Holland) 5-3
8. Rade Petrovic (Yugoslavia) 5-3
9. Helmut Hasibeder (Austria) 5-3
10. Laurent Heiser (Luxembourg) 5-3
11. Sang Dae Hahn (Australia) 5-3
12. Frederic Donzet (France) 5-3
13. Terence Stacey (U.K.) 4-4
14. Ron Snyder (U.S.A.) 4-4
15. Ivan Detkov (U.S.S.R.) 4-4
16. Ray Tomes (N.Z.) 4-4

Next year the tournament goes overseas for the first time, being scheduled to be staged in Peking. A full report on this year's tournament will be presented in the third issue of *Ranka*, the bulletin of the International Go Federation.

Go Seigen Receives Honorary Degree

In what is probably a first for a go player, Go Seigen has received the honorary degree of Doctor of Literature from Hong Kong University. A number of go players have received decorations from the Japanese government, but this is the first honorary degree for a go player that we know of. The conferral ceremony will be held on 30 October this year. This is only the 31st honorary degree awarded by Hong Kong University.

British Results

1986 Trigantius Tournament

At the Trigantius tournament held on 8 March, prizes for three wins were won by J.Y. Lee 5-dan

of Nottingham, D. Cann 2-dan of Coventry, A. Rix 1-dan of London, and seven other players.

Ipswich Tournament

This tournament was held on 20 April and attracted 30 players. The winner was T. Mark Hall 3-dan of London. D. Ward qualified for the 1987 Candidates tournament.

1986 Candidates Tournament

26 players participated in the Candidates tournament held at IVC on 3–5 May. The three qualifiers, each with 5 wins out of 6, were Eddie Shaw, Francis Roads, and T. Mark Hall. Reserves, with 4/6 and in order of tie-break, were Alistair Thompson, Piers Shepperson, Harold Lee, and Richard Granville.

1986 Bracknell Go Tournament

The 8th Bracknell Go Tournament was held at ICL on 17 May and attracted the highest ever entry of 76. The winner was Jim Barty 4-dan of London. M. Cumper and P. Atwell won 3/3 and qualified for the 1987 Candidates tournament.

1986 Challengers League

This was won by Matthew Macfadyen with a perfect 7/7 record. Piers Shepperson (5.5), Jim Barty (4.5), and Harold Lee (4) retained their places for next year's league.

Yugoslavia Wins Match Against Austria

In an international team match held in Maribor,

Yugoslavia, on 5, 6 April, an eight-man Yugoslavian team defeated an Austrian team 9–7. Last year two such matches were played, one on 30, 31 March, won 13–3 by Yugoslavia and one on 7, 8 September, won 10–6 by Austria.

1986 International Paris Go Tournament

This year 260 players met in Paris for the Easter tournament held on 29–31 March over six rounds, MacMahon system. The top section was won by Yoo Jong-su 6-dan of Korea with six straight wins (last year he was second to Moussa). Equal second on five wins were Andre Moussa 5-dan of France and Lee S.G. 5-dan of Korea. The latter also won the lightning tournament.

In the section for 2-kyu to 2-dan, the following players finished with 5 wins: Séailles 2-dan (France), Warnaar 2-dan (Holland), Polak 1-dan (Holland), Keirkmann 1-dan (W. Germany), Admiraal 1-kyu (Holland), Liao 2-kyu (China), and Ohana 2-kyu (France).

Worthy of note in the section for 3-kyu and under were the performances of Gaschignard 9-kyu of France and Wilken 12-kyu of W. Germany, both of whom scored six wins.

The winner of the random draw for a ticket to Korea among players 2-kyu and up with five wins was Ron Polak.



Laurent Heiser of Luxembourg plays Yoo of Korea in the 1986 Paris Easter tournament. On the inside board, Moussa (left) is playing Donzet (both of France).

10th Kisei Title

Fighting in a wheelchair

The 1986 Kisei title match attracted a great amount of attention from the mass media in Japan but for an unfortunate reason: it was the first title match contested by a player in a wheelchair. As described in detail in GW42 (page 2), the title-holder Cho Chikun suffered multiple injuries in a traffic accident on 6 January, just ten days before the title match was scheduled to begin. According to his doctors, his injuries, which included a broken thigh bone, injuries to both knees and two broken bones in his left hand, would take three months to heal and one year for a complete recovery. On the 8th, Cho underwent a two hour 50 minute operation, which would normally be followed by one month's hospitalization, so at this stage the sponsoring newspaper and the Nihon Ki-in were wondering if the title match would take place at all.

They reckoned without Cho's will-power and complete dedication to go. He insisted from the start that he would not forfeit even one game of

the title match (the itinerary of a title match cannot be changed once it has been decided) and managed to talk his doctors into letting him play. He also overcame the opposition of his older brother, Cho Shoen 5-dan, who thought that playing would risk delaying his recovery.

Cho played the first game in a wheelchair and handicapped by four plaster casts, which meant that he had to sit at an angle to the go board. He was of course the first player to fight a title match under such disadvantageous conditions, though there is the precedent for playing in a chair, instead of sitting down Japanese style, of Go Seigen, who was knocked over by a motorcycle in 1961. In the circumstances, losing the first game by just two and a half points was an extraordinary performance, but what was even more extraordinary was that he went on to win the second and third games and take a lead over Kobayashi. It goes without saying that no other player has ever played so well under such adverse circumstances.



Cho rises to the greatest challenge of his career and plays the first Kisei title game just ten days after suffering multiple injuries in a traffic accident. Going over the first game with the players are Rin Kaiho and Fujisawa Shuko.

Cho and Kobayashi

When Cho's wife saw how determined he was to play the title match whatever the pain and discomfort, she says that she realized how completely he lived for go. His resolution must have been fortified by the fact that the challenger was the player who had taken the Meijin title away from him last year. There is a lot of speculation in the go press about the keenness of the rivalry between these two. Kobayashi was quite forthright about admitting before the 1985 Meijin match that toppling Cho was his main target, but as Cho has been the top player for the last five years, that was only natural.

Kobayashi's ambition has now been fulfilled: he has taken Cho's place at the peak of the go world, reducing him in the process to the status of an untitled 9-dan. The rivalry between the two goes back a long way. Cho is four years younger than Kobayashi, but when the latter entered the Kitani school in 1965, aged 12, Cho had already been a disciple for three years. He was also a little stronger, and it was quite a shock for Kobayashi to have to take black against him.

The two promptly played a 100-game series in which the fortunes fluctuated violently: each was forced to four stones. The desire to catch up with Cho was undoubtedly a powerful incentive to study for Kobayashi. Ishida Yoshio comments: 'Koichi owes what he is today to Cho.'

Being older and more serious (Cho's legendary devotion to study did not begin until his teens), Kobayashi did catch up and in fact became shodan a year before Cho. Their rivalry continued during their early years as professionals and their careers were roughly parallel, though Kobayashi had the better of it in the three minor titles in which they clashed in the 1970's. As indicated below, the two climbed the promotion ladder at a similar rate.

	<i>Kobayashi</i>	<i>Cho</i>
<i>1-dan:</i>	1967	1968
<i>2-dan:</i>	1967	1968
<i>3-dan:</i>	1968	1969
<i>4-dan:</i>	1969	1970
<i>5-dan:</i>	1970	1971
<i>6-dan:</i>	1972	1973
<i>7-dan:</i>	1974	1975
<i>8-dan:</i>	1977	1978
<i>9-dan:</i>	1979	1981

In the 1980's, however, Kobayashi was eclipsed when Cho made his extraordinary breakthrough and started setting all his records. He took the Meijin title in 1980, the Honinbo in 1981, the Judan in 1982, then the Kisei in 1983, becoming, if only for a brief period, the first player ever to hold the top four titles simultaneously. About this time, probably the only person who still thought that he was a rival to Cho was Kobayashi himself.

Cho followed the recent pattern established by Rin and Ishida of taking the top titles in one's twenties. Kobayashi has followed what used to be considered the normal pattern of reaching one's maturity in one's thirties. (When Rin challenged Sakata for the Meijin title, the latter rashly commented that 'a Meijin in his twenties is inconceivable'.)

Success is undoubtedly all the sweeter for Kobayashi for having had to wait for it. Go fans have been waiting for ten years for him to make the breakthrough, but even so no one expected it to be of this magnitude. The recent increase in his strength and self-confidence has been remarkable. Sakata comments: 'My impression is that his art has suddenly improved. On top of that, he's become mentally tough. He wins the crucial games he used to lose.'

This mental toughness is probably the key factor in his success. Professionals often comment that what matters in a title match is not the difference in skill between the players because at the top level this is almost non-existent; what matters are the concentration and combativeness they can bring to bear on the match. In this respect, Kobayashi is probably unbeatable at the moment. Just how formidable his self-confidence is can be seen in the positive way he played after losing successive games in both this Kisei match and last year's Meijin match. Otake, who in the past showed some reluctance to recognize Kobayashi as a top-flight player, now guarantees that the Kobayashi age will continue for the next couple of years.

Game One

An unexpected victim of Cho's accident was his opponent. The uncertainty it created put great pressure on Kobayashi and he confessed to Sakata that he was unable to sleep at night worrying about what was going to happen to the match.

He said that he thought he was going crazy. His play in the first game shows that he got the better of his nerves, but he was in a no-win position: if he won, Cho would get all the sympathy, but if he lost — well, that didn't bear thinking about.

White: Kobayashi Koichi, Meijin, Judan & Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each.

Played on 16, 17 January 1986.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko, Honorary Kisei.






Figure 1 (1 – 50)

30: connects



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 – 50). White starts well.

White 10. An improvement by Kobayashi. In a previous game with Cho, he had played the kosumi at 'a', but then Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 22 had combined well with Black 3.

Black 17 is correct strategy. If instead Black jumps to 'd', he is unable to make a counter-pincer against 16.

White 22 is a good move: it forestalls Black



Dia. 3

'b' and maintains balance. This move was followed by the luncheon recess. Kobayashi was playing at a more leisurely pace than in last year's Meijin title match.

Black 23. Presumably Cho felt that answering 22 immediately would have been submissive. The exchange that follows 23 is natural.

White 32 is correct. Cutting at 1 in Dia. 1 actually helps Black to strengthen himself. He also gets the aji of 'a'.


White 34. Attaching at 1 in Dia. 2 is also big. If Black resists with 2 and 4, White fights with 5. Kobayashi's 34 makes miai of 1 here and 36 in the figure.

White 36. If omitted, Black 44 is big.

Black 37. Close to being the losing move. Black should push along at 1 in Dia. 3. If 2 to 5 follow, Black makes a big reduction in White's top area. He should get a chance to connect at 'a' later, and in the meantime he has the threat of 'b'. The thinness of White's position would also make the aji of 'c' disturbing.


White 44. If he connects, Black aims at the Black 'e'—White 'f'—Black 'g' combination.

Black 45. The sealed move. Black seems to have no good follow-up to 43, so taking territory with 45 is reasonable (it forestalls White 'h'). If instead Black follows Dia. 4, White doesn't fight a ko but counters with 6 and 8. If Black switches to 5 in Dia. 5, White plays 6 and is untroubled.



Dia. 4

7: takes; 9: connects



Dia. 5

The black group could well end up being a burden to Black.

White 46. An example of Kobayashi's willingness to simplify in a difficult position. Shuko: 'The shoulder hit of 46 took me by surprise. If Kobayashi had calculated that this was enough to win, then it shows formidable self-confidence. I would probably think of entering more deeply. Of course, it's not easy to say exactly where one would play.' Because Black played low with 35 (instead of on the 4th line), he could answer 'i' at 'j' and expect to kill White outright.

White 50, destroying what aji 43 does have, shows that White is confident he is ahead.






Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100). *The endgame begins.*

White 54 is a good answer to 53. Perhaps Black should have attached at 'a', forcing White to extend at 'b', then played at 67. At this stage White is already ahead, though only by a narrow margin, and just wants to wrap up the game. Since Cho and Kobayashi are both territorial





Dia. 7




Figure 4 (151 - 216)

Figure 4 (151 - 216). Cho's indomitable spirit

Although he lost without putting up his usual dogged resistance, Cho did not look unhappy after this game. He had satisfied himself that he could stand up to the rigours of a two-day game and in the circumstances it was a miracle that he got so close. His performance can only be called a triumph of will-power. According to Kobayashi, Cho seemed to be in some pain on the morning of the second day, but his stamina held out. In fact, after the game finished at 7.31 p.m., he stayed up until 4 a.m. talking with Shuko and his doctor (who was in attendance on him throughout the first three games).

White wins by 2½ points.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 29 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 58 minutes.

(*'Kido'*, March 1986)

Game Two

An extra two weeks had passed when Cho played this game, and it is readily apparent in his play that his recovery had proceeded apace. He

was still playing in a wheelchair, but he did not seem to be any pain to speak of. The game is an excellent one for Cho: he took a lead early in the fuseki and ruthlessly quelled Kobayashi's attempts to get back in the game. In fact, it can be inferred from Kobayashi's comments after the game that his defeat was quite a shock for him.

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 29, 30 January 1986 in Matsue City.

Commentary by Takemiya Honinbo.




Figure 1 (1 - 46)

Figure 1 (1 - 46). The losing move?


White 2, 4. Takemiya: 'I just about always play niren-sei, so Cho played it to make me look good.'

Black 3-7. The Kobayashi fuseki.

Black 13 was not well received. Kobayashi: 'I've seen this invasion before and I wanted to try it once.' Go Seigen: 'Black 13 is the losing move.' Takemiya also exclaimed 'This move is wrong' the instant that he saw it. He argued that White's thickness up to 28 was superior to Black's profit (presumably also the reason for Go Seigen's disapproval). For 13, Go advocated Black 'a', White 'b', Black 32, aiming next at building up a moyo with 'c'. Takemiya wanted simply to play 13 at 27, leaving open Black's options on the right side.

White 32 and 33 are more or less miai.

White 34 is a good move. If at 35 (which looks natural, blocking off the centre), Black gets a



bit too much territory with 43; if instead at 43, Black 34 would work well, helping Black to move out into the centre and nullify White's thickness below.

Black 35. Black can't permit White 'd', but White 36 is a good answer. If Black blocks immediately at 39, he runs into trouble, in the shape of Dia. 1, while counterattacking with 1 in Dia. 2 gives White too big a corner (he also gets an annoying follow-up at 'a'). This would be inconsistent with Black's territory-oriented opening strategy.

The sequence to 46 is inevitable. At this point Takemiya commented: 'Black can't win.'




Figure 2 (47 – 100)

Figure 2 (47 – 100). *Extraordinary positional judgement*

Black 49. Being behind, Black has to start a fight.

Black 61. The sealed move. Time used for the first day was five hours 36 minutes for Cho to one hour 36 minutes for Kobayashi – exactly

four hours difference.

White 66. A superb point – Kobayashi was probably not happy with the way the fight was going.

White 70. White could also play at 'a', driving Black out into the centre (Black would attach at 98).

White 78 to 82 provoked astonishment and admiration. Takemiya: 'Probably no other professional would play these moves in this position.' Most players would, of course, want to attack the unsettled black groups at the top and on the left – with luck, White might get a double attack. But then few other players share Cho's accuracy at positional judgement. He calculated that these endgame moves would win him the game and he was right. Quite a few professionals believed that Kobayashi was ahead; actually the position is not an easy one to calculate, as it's hard to estimate the value of White's thickness on the right.

White 84, 86. Correct timing: these moves are not aji-keshi once Black has defended at 83.

White 88. Now Cho attacks. This is a good example of how he controls the pace of the game, speeding up here, slowing down there.

Black 93. An emergency measure: Black's two groups above are still unsettled, but he can't let the centre get any bigger.




Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Figure 3 (101 – 150). *A safe lead*

White 26. Cho went into byo-yomi, but he looked unworried; he was sure of his win.




Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Black 51, 53. A sacrifice to set up forcing moves at 93 and 95.

Black 61. Black 'a' is a little better. White cannot win the ko after Black 87, White 88, Black 90, so he would have to give way at 90.

Figure 5 (201 - 238)

In the postgame analysis, Cho showed a smiling face for the first time since his accident. This win must have been very reassuring. He not only won, he denied his opponent any chance to make a game of it. For his part, Kobayashi was reluctant to accept the verdict on his early invasion.




Figure 5 (201 - 238)

21: ko; 37: connects (at 18)

'It hurts to have 13 (in Figure 1) called the losing move,' he said. 'I intend to try this pattern once more.' He put the blame for his loss on 35, commenting that he should have made a two-space extension down the left side from 33 instead, as Black 35 just provoked the excellent white counter of 36.

White wins by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 6 hours 55 minutes.

(Translated from the Yomiuri)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 5, 6 February 1986 at the Chusonji Temple, Hiraizumi, Iwate prefecture.

Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 - 51)




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 - 51). Novel shape

Black 21. Black could also follow Dia. 1.

White 26. A strange-looking move. After it was telephoned through to the Nihon Ki-in, Abe 8-dan, who was to give a public commentary on the game the next day, asked a Ki-in employee to



Dia. 3

ring back to verify it. The conventional move here is the jump to 1 in Dia. 2, but that lets Black take the corner with 2 and 4. White 26 defends against this cut.

Cho: 'White 26 puts me on the spot. Perhaps I should have followed Dia. 3 with 25.'

Black 27. A sacrifice to build thickness on the left.

White 50. If omitted, Black 'a' would be severe, but White 51 would also be a good move, as it is the crucial point in the balance of power in the centre. It would also threaten to cut at 'b'; if Black defended at 'c', White could then switch to 50. However, Kobayashi was convinced that Black would ignore White 51 in favour of attacking at 'a'; that move, he said, would have been unbearable.




Figure 2 (52 - 100)


Figure 2 (52 - 100). *Black takes the lead.*

White is forced to move out clumsily


with 52 to 58, weakening his two stones on the right side, but that can't be helped.

White 60. The sealed move.

After 63, the continuation to 69 is forced. White would now like to set up a geta with 70 at 84, but it would be unreasonable. After 1 in Dia. 4, Black exchanges 2 for 3 (the timing is important), then cuts with 4 and wins the fight. The continuation from 7 is just one example. The result up to 26 is a ko, but White can't win. Cutting at 'a' does not work either: Black plays



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

'b', White 'c', Black 'd', and 'e' is Black's privilege.

Black 79 is a courageous move, as the exchange to 86 complicates the game. Black's two-stone capture is of course superior to White's because of its greater influence, but White can now aim at cutting below 68 and below 100. Playing solidly at 81 with 79 would have been good enough.

White 88. White should first force with 91. However, with 91 Black misses his chance to go as far as 92. Dia. 5 shows that White cannot intercept at 2 (if White 4 at 5, his group dies after Black 'a').

Black 93. Black 94 is superior. Black has lost some points in this area, but his lead is not affected.

Black 97. White can play 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' later.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Figure 2 (101 - 150). Unable to catch up

White 2. Aji-keshi, but White can't afford to worry about that, in view of the weakness of his right-side group. It is also essential for him to keep sente so that he can play first on the left side.

White 24. If at 25, Black plays 'a' and wins, so White takes a chance. However, he does not gain anything up to 37.

Figure 4 (151 - 200). Safety first

Black 55. The spectators thought that Cho might try to kill the white group, but Cho, who was already in byo-yomi, contented himself with securing the safety of his own group and taking






Figure 4 (151 - 200)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

sente. Dia. 6 shows that if Black does try to kill White, the latter turns on his attacker. A ko results. Playing 1 at 1 in Dia. 7 is worse: White wins the fight outright.

Dia. 7. After 2 to 14, Black loses the semeai. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.

Black 59. The last large point.




Figure 5 (201 - 251)

Figure 5 (201 - 251). A one-sided game

Like the second game, the challenger never had a real chance to win. Playing go seemed to be acting as a tonic to Cho. His uncharacteristic loss in the first game had had go fans worried, but after his masterpiece in the second game

and his almost flawless play in this game Kobayashi fans were the ones who were feeling anxious. Kobayashi himself admitted to feeling perplexed. 'This is not the go of a sick man,' he said after this game. 'Cho is in top form.'

Black wins by 1½ points.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 53 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes.

(Yomiuri Shimbun)

Game Four

This was the first game for which Cho's doctor was not in attendance on him throughout the game. Cho was still in a wheelchair, but he had had the plaster removed from his hand and his legs. He was well enough to make his first appearance at the welcome party held by local go fans the night before the game.

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 19, 20 February 1986 in Abashiri City, Hokkaido. *Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.*




Figure 1 (1 - 32)


Figure 1 (1 - 32). Sente, sente

Black 7-11. Black chooses a straightforward joseki. His main concern is to take sente so that he can play 15.


White 16. A solid move. White in turn wants sente so that he can play 24.

Black 27. The only move once Black has played 25.

White 28. A good move. White usually invades the corner when Black makes the narrow pincer of 27, but here the result in Dia. 1 would be uninteresting for him. Black 10 is a superb point.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (33 - 70)


51: connects; 53, 60, 69: ko

Figure 2 (33 - 70). Cho's centre strategy

Black 33 was regretted by Kobayashi. The straightforward move of 1 in Dia. 2 was possible. The only problem is that after White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c', the marked black stone would be inefficient compared to the corresponding white stone at 'a'. Once Black plays 33, the trade to 39 is inevitable.


White 40. White plays solidly because of the weakness of his group in the bottom right. If he captured with 1 in Dia. 3 (next page), Black 'a', threatening Black 'b', would build thickness, which even at this distance would menace the white group below.

Black 43. Kobayashi assumed that 43 would be sente and planned to jump to 'a' next, but Cho



Dia. 3

Dia. 4



Dia. 5


surprised him by discarding the three stones. Since last year's Meijin title match, there has been a subtle change in Cho's style; he now shows more concern with centre influence than previously. The hane at 1 in Dia. 4 is probably the correct move for 43. After 2 and 4, Black can expand his moyo in a similar fashion to Dia. 1 with 5 or 'a'.

Black 47, 49. Black makes use of his wealth of ko threats in the bottom right. From this point on the game becomes extremely difficult.

Black 57 minimizes White's ko threats. Black could answer on top with 1 in Dia. 5, but after the sequence to 12 Black would not be able to get any ko threats against the white group.

White 62. The sealed move.

White 68. A mistake in timing. White should first push through at 1 in Dia. 6, as that would



Dia. 6 7: ko

make 5 sente. Black would be in a tough position after 7; if Black 'a', White attacks on a large scale while also expanding his moyo at the top with 'b'. Once White has lived with 68 in the figure, Black will ignore 'b'.

White 70. White has run out of ko threats.





Figure 3 (71 - 100)

87: ko



Dia. 7

Dia. 8


Dia. 9

Figure 3 (71 - 100). A fatal blunder


White 76 is the vital point, but White could also connect at 1 in Dia. 7. If Black 2, he could reinforce his group with 3, then expand his moyo with 5. Black would have to initiate any attack with 'a', so the white group is not as weak as it looks.

White 78. If simply at 1 in Dia. 8, Black takes the ko, as he gets a ko threat at 'a'.


White 80 is bad. White should have made the diagonal connection at 1 in Dia. 9. If Black 2 and 4, White gets a good result with 5 and 7.




Dia. 10
5, 8: ko



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

Black's only sente move here is at 'a' — a big contrast to Dia. 11 below. Therefore —

Dia. 10. Black will probably fight the ko with 2 and 4, but even so White is satisfied with his thickness up to 11.

White 82 is worse than 80: it loses the game. Cho overlooked the possibility of Black 83. Instead of 82, he should have linked up with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11. Black 'a' is sente (an improvement for him on Dia. 9), but though he has greater thickness than in Dia. 10, he still only has one eye, so White can look forward to attacking him.

For 83, Cho had expected 1 in Dia. 12. He planned to answer patiently with 2 and 4 and aim at the severe move at 'a'.

White 84. White 85, permitting Black to play 84 in sente (forcing White 'a'), would be bad. White takes two stones with 86, but the thickness he has given Black with 85 puts him irretrievably behind. White's loss from 82 is equivalent to the komi.

Although two thirds of the moves are still to

be played, the game is over after Cho's slip on the left side. Kobayashi skilfully solidifies his lead and winds up the game. First of all, he lays waste to the top area, with the help of the sabaki tesuji of 93.




Figure 4 (101 - 149)

Figure 4 (101 - 149). Playing solidly

Black 1. Black could capture the two stones with 1 in Dia. 13, but he does not want to give White the forcing move at 2. After Black lives up to 9, White can attack at 10. Black prefers to link up solidly with 1 to 5 in the figure.




Figure 5 (150 - 204)

67: ko; 85: connects (at 76)

Figure 5 (150–204) (previous page)

Black 75. If at 'a', Black 'b' will not be sente.

White 78. If White captures the two stones, Black attaches at 'c'.




Figure 6 (205 – 265)

30: connects (at 15); 33, 36, 39: ko (over 19);
40: between 28 and 27; 41: left of 27; 42, 45,
48, 51, 54, 57: ko; 59: connects.

Figure 6 (205 – 265)

Black does not need to win the final ko, but when asked by the Yomiuri reporter why he fought it out, Kobayashi replied: 'If you compromise once, it becomes a habit and you start playing slack everywhere.'



With the aid of a little luck, Kobayashi draws level with Cho.

This was the first seesaw game of the series: till now, the first player taking the lead had kept it to the end. Cho had played very well until his slack play on the left side let Kobayashi even the series.

Black wins by 2½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 6 hours 41 minutes.

('Kido', April 1986)

Game Five

A bit over seven weeks had now passed since Cho's accident and he seemed to have recovered considerably. Although he was still using a wheelchair, he was able for the first time to play sitting down Japanese style. Incidentally, this was the fifth game between these two during February.

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 26, 27 February 1986 in Kagoshima.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *An aggressive invasion*


Black 1, 9, 11. The 'three crows' (sanbagarasu), a shape which Kobayashi used against Cho in their Honinbo league game three days before this game.

White 20. Usually White would block at 21, as that is the wider side, but he plays 20 because he is aiming at 28.

Black 31. The aim of 31 would seem to be the



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

placement of 'a', but Black 35 contradicts that. If Black is going to continue like this, he should play 31 at 1 in Dia. 1 or instead attach at 'a', according to Ishida Yoshio.

White 34 is a good point. Black sacrifices a stone to move out up to 45, but White is probably satisfied with this result. Perhaps for this reason, Black decides to start a fight with the aggressive invasion at 47.

White 48. If at 1 in Dia. 2 to stop Black from linking up along the edge, Black makes shape with 2 to 10. White now has little prospect of making a severe attack.

Footnote: After the game, Kobayashi said that in view of Cho's style he naturally expected him to invade at 47. He wondered if, therefore, he should not have pushed once more with 46 at 'b', then jumped to 'd' after Black 'c'. If his moyo were deeper, it would be harder for Black to invade at 47. An alternative was proposed by Otake (the referee for this game), who maintained that correct style here was the simple knight's move of 44 at 'e'.

Figure 2 (51 – 100). *A successful invasion*

White 52. The sealed move. White 53 would be peaceful, but Kobayashi refuses to compromise. For the second time in this game, White lets Black split his position down the middle. If White 52 at 53, Black takes sente with Black 52, White 65, Black 'a', then links up with 'b'. However, Black 53, splitting White into two, is a powerful move. (If Black 53 at 'b', White is happy to push through at 'a'.)

White 56. The only move for continuing the attack. White 1 in Dia. 3 seems to catch Black in a net, but he lives easily with 2 to 14.

White 62. White would like to be able to con-







Figure 2 (51 – 100)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

nect at 64, but Black has no trouble breaking out as in Dia. 4.

Black 73. Black has extricated his group and destroyed White's moyo, so his invasion has been a success. Opinion varied on this result. Otake, Go Seigen and Fujisawa Shuko thought that Black was a little ahead, Rin that the game was even,

and Ishida Yoshio (a minority of one) that White was ahead. Kobayashi himself admitted after the game that he had probably been a little outplayed here, though he thought that he was still in the game. After all, neither black group was definitely settled yet.

White 74 aims at attacking the group above, so 75 is necessary.

Black 87. Kudo advocated splitting White with 1 to 5 in Dia. 5 (previous page).





Figure 3 (101 - 140)

Figure 3 (101 - 140). *Trouble in the corner*


Black 5, 7. Cho regretted playing these moves at this stage, but once having played them, he said, he should have continued with 9 at 13. The reason was the bad aji left in his position. Black 5 and 7 give White the peep at 'a', for a start. White can also reduce the corner with 'b', Black 'c', White 'd' (compared to Black 13, the corner is reduced by more than 15 points).

Black 9 is, of course, a good move in itself, as it eliminates the various forcing moves White could make here, but in a public commentary on the game Ishida agreed with Cho in advocating defending at 13. He was quite surprised when White played 10 and 12 instead of attacking the bottom right corner. White 12, in particular, looks almost like a dame (worthless point), but after a while Ishida woke up to its virtues and ended up praising it lavishly. Ishida: 'White 10 and 12 are not easy moves to play. They show that Kobayashi is in peak form.'

White 12 is a thick move that menaces both



Dia. 6 13: connects



Dia. 7 8: ko

the corner and the centre group. Cho was well aware of this, but he obstinately reinforced his corner with 13, defying White to do his worst. In retrospect, he should have defended the centre with 'e'.

White 20 strikes at the vital point of the three crows. Black has little freedom of action in answering, as he must be careful not to hurt his centre group. For example, he could secure the corner with 25 at 1 in Dia. 6, but this is just what White is hoping for. He would sacrifice and squeeze up to 14, then capture the centre group with 'f' in the figure.

White 30. It is now apparent that 12 is right on the vital point.

Black 31 is the losing move. Instead, Black must connect at 1 in Dia. 7. A ko follows after 4, but since it is an approach-move ko for White, the corner can be considered as captured by Black. White is behind in territory, so he has to catch

the centre group. A very difficult, unpredictable fight will follow after Black 21.

Black 31 and 33 cause Black to lose all five stones; White takes the lead.




Figure 4 (141 - 186)

Figure 4 (141 - 186). *Going out fighting*

Black 47. Cho refuses to give up. He takes a large endgame point and defies White to capture the centre group. At least, this simplifies the issue.

Black 49. Black 50 would make it a little more difficult for White, but even so Black would not be able to live.

Black 85. Cho was in his last minute of byo-yomi and he played this move hurriedly on the count of 59 but placed it on the wrong point. He had meant to cut one line below, not that that would have worked any better. When he saw 86, he decided against continuing his futile resistance.

Kobayashi has become a territorial player in recent years, but in this game he reminded the fans that he was originally an attacking player. When Cho destroyed his moyo, he had to stake everything on attack and in the end he was able to bring it off. The highlight of the game was his move at 12 in Figure 3. Kobayashi: 'I'll probably remember that kosumi all my life.' This move probably deserves a large part of the credit for his becoming Kisei.

Black resigns after White 186.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 39 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes.

(Translated from the Yomiuri)

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 12, 13 March 1986 at Gero spa in Gifu prefecture. *Commentary by Kato Masao.*




Figure 1 (1 - 31)


Figure 1 (1 - 31). *Avalanche variation*

Black 1, 3. Unusual for Kobayashi in recent years, but he also played niren-sei against Takemiya in the first game of the Judan title match the week before (see GW45).


Black 19 is a special strategy. The most common joseki is Black 1 in Dia. 1. Black takes sente here, but in compensation White gets forcing moves at 'a' and 'b' and builds thickness. In the figure, Black ends in gote up to 25, but he can aim at making the hane at 'a' and attacking the three white stones below. Kobayashi likes to build solid positions and attack later.

White 26 is a good guess. White would prefer to play 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', but instead of answering at 'c' Black will make a pincer around 'd', which would nullify the force of White's influence in the top left.

Black 27. Kobayashi likes the low move. Takemiya would play 'e', but Kobayashi does not like the weakness that leaves at 'f' after 29. Apparently




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

that weakness does not bother Takemiya at all.

Black 31. The idea of the tenuki is probably to leave open the option of attacking at 'g' depending on what happens in the bottom left corner. Or perhaps Kobayashi thought that if the 1–2 exchange in Dia. 2 had first been made, White might answer 3 at 4, as White's position at the bottom is already solid.



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (31 – 70)


Figure 2 (31 – 70). *Cho's flexibility*

Black 31 may look a little strange, as White's position is open at the side below 22 (usually a move in such an area is not worth much for either side), but it is not a mistake in direction. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 3, Black plays 2 and 4. Black 5 next would be severe, so White would have to defend there. This result would not be bad for White, but he counters with 32 to avoid letting Black dictate the flow of the game. The focus of the play here is the follow-up to the avalanche joseki at the top. The moves to 35 can be seen as inevitable.

With 45, Black finally makes the hane he has been aiming at. White counters with a resolute move at 48. The usual idea would be the second



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


approach move at 1 in Dia. 4, and going for territory like this would actually be more in keeping with Cho's style. (Note that in this case the wedge at 2 in Dia. 5 is not very good, as 5 is just right for Black.)

White 50 is a shape move and serves to build up White's moyo at the top, but the proper move (honte) is 'a'. Cho's style has certainly changed recently. Previously he would have been happy to take Black's side in this fuseki. Perhaps he's been influenced by Takemiya.

White 52. Cho regretted not pressing at 56 immediately. When Black already has 55 in place, he can defer answering at 69.

Black 57, 59. Black probably planned this counterattack when he descended at 55.

White 60. What happens if White answers 59 directly? The continuation to 15 in Dia. 6 simplifies the game and is unappealing for White. That's why he dodges to 60. This kind of diversionary attack in the middle of a busy fight epitomizes the flexibility Cho aspires to in his game (see GW23, page 26).




Dia. 6 *Dia. 7*

Black 61 (the sealed move) to 65 are natural. Any answer Black made on the right side with 61 would be submissive.


Black 69. Cutting at 1 in Dia. 7 would be a little reckless. After 2 to 8, Black would have to play 9 to defend against White 'a', but then 10 to 16 damage his group below.

The fight comes to a pause with 70. In a kind of furikawari, each side has ravaged the other's moyo, and the result seems even. That means that White's bold switch to 60 has been a success.




Dia. 8

Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

it is the premise for invading at 77. For 76, one's normal impulse would be to hane at 1 in Dia. 8, but then Black 2 is still a good move. White can cut the group off with 3 and 5, but he can't hope to kill it.

White 78 is a thick move: White not only aims at the black group on the side but also hopes to make something of the centre.

White 84 might be dubious; capturing two black stones with 'a' could be bigger. If White 'a', Black would probably block at 'b', leading to a leisurely game. For his part, Cho wondered whether he shouldn't have played 84 at 'c'. This does seem superior to 84. The only thing is that if Black then plays 'd', White 'e' does not really get enough territory in the centre. On the other hand, Black could not be confident that 'd' would be enough when White has played 84. A difference of one line can completely change the game.

Black 85 is natural but severe all the same. White would love to cut at 1 in Dia. 9, but making bad shape with 3 would be unbearable. The fight after 4 of White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd' is bad for White. If White switches 3 to 3 in Dia. 10, he captures three stones, but then Black 6 and 8 wipe out his centre





Figure 3 (71 - 100)
92, 95: ko

Figure 3 (71 - 100). Focus on the centre

Black 73 looks like a good forcing move.

Black 75 looks like a cramped little move, but




Dia. 12


moyo. Cho commented that he should have played 86 at 1 in Dia. 11; if Black 2, he can be satisfied with the result to 5.

Black 99, aiming to turn the centre into a worthless area, is a good move and the reason why Cho regretted not playing one line lower. Kobayashi said that he had been aiming at this move since Cho played 84.

White 100. White could try to take territory in the centre with 1 in Dia. 12, but he doesn't like the prospect of Black 6.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

12: connects




Figure 4 (101 - 157)

Ko: 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52

Figure 4 (101 - 157). Small slips by Cho

White 2. If omitted, White would be forced on the defensive by Black 2.

Black 3 is aggressive. If at 4, White would get territory with 3. Kobayashi does not believe in half measures: he wants to destroy all the centre

area.

Black 7 defends the cutting point left below his next move at 9. If White keeps attacking with 1 in Dia. 13, Black cuts and captures with 6 and 8. If White 1 at 'a', Black captures with 'b' etc.


White 14. Cho went into byo-yomi, as usual at a critical juncture of the game.

Black 21 is a slip. White 20 threatens to cut at 27, but before defending Black should squeeze as in Dia. 14. That would eliminate Black's weakness at 'a' in the figure. The success Black has achieved in the centre fight is almost negated by this slip, though he remains a touch ahead.

White 28. Cho went into his final minute of byo-yomi. He would pick up his stone on the count of 'eight' of the final ten seconds, then play on 'nine' — an unnerving sight for the spectators. He would have lost on time if the timekeeper ever got to 'ten'.


Black 29 aims at cutting at 'b'.

White 30. The hane at 1 in Dia. 15 is still big. Since Black is going to give way at 53



Dia. 15

Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Dia. 18


anyway, the ko with 30 is not important.

Black 33. Black prefers sacrificing the stones to giving White a sente move at 39.

White 50, provoking Black 51, is careless; it gives Black a good continuation at 55. White should simply play at 1 in Dia. 16, as 2 is not as good for Black as 55. White gets the aji of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Black 53. The only move. If at 1 in Dia. 17, living with 3 and 5 is ignominious. If Black is greedy and plays 5 at 1 in Dia. 18, White kills him with 2 to 8. After 9, White plays at 4.

White 56 is another simple slip: correct is White 'c', which Black would also answer at 57. There is no guarantee after 56 that White 'c' will be sente, while Black now has the option of capturing with 1 in Dia. 19.



Dia. 19

Dia. 20

Figure 5 (158 – 200). Last chance?

White 58 is the proper move. One might be tempted to try to capture the five black stones on a large scale by playing at 59, but after





Figure 5 (158 – 200)

96: ko



Dia. 21

Black 73, Black would be able to rescue them with 'a'. Nonetheless, Black seems to be a little ahead when he plays 59.

White 60 captures the black stones to the left. The blame for this can be laid on missing the squeeze in Dia. 14. Black 67 is countered by White 68, but Black sacrifices an extra stone to make 71 and 73 sente. White cannot cut after 74, as demonstrated in Dia. 20.

Kobayashi's skilful play with 61 to 73 seemed to have decided the game, but then he went wrong with 75. This should be at 'b', which would stop White from getting any territory in the centre above. However, Cho let slip his last chance with 84. If he had attached at 1 in Dia. 21, the game might still have been a contest. The result to 5 is clearly an improvement on the figure for White. Even so, Kato could not find a win for him. He hypothesizes the continuation to 11. White ends in gote, so Black switches to 92 or 'g' in the figure and just manages to keep his

lead.

Black 85 finally does decide the game. If White cuts with 'c', Black 'd', White 89, Black 88, White 'e', then Black escapes with 'f'. After he saw 85, Cho gave spectators the impression that he was resigned to losing.




Figure 6 (201 – 241)

Figure 5 (201 – 241). The third Kisei

Black 23. Black 'a' is sente, so Black could cut at 31.

When Cho resigned, he was apparently behind by $1\frac{1}{2}$ or $2\frac{1}{2}$ points. He doesn't usually resign games this close, but perhaps his strength was exhausted. He did not make any major mistakes, and it is hard to single out a specific game-losing move, but perhaps the accumulated disadvantage from his various dubious moves cost him the game.

Kobayashi also made some minor slips, but he never at any point had a bad game. He was always fighting on equal terms or threatening to overpower his opponent. He had reason to be satisfied with his performance in the game that made him the third Kisei.

White resigns after White 241.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 19 minutes.

('Kido', May 1986)

The rapidity with which Kobayashi climbed to the peak of the Japanese go world was



Kobayashi Koichi scores his second major triumph over Cho Chikun. Showing a keen interest in the board are Tsuchida 9-dan and Hane 9-dan.

astonishing: in barely five months he had won three titles, the Meijin, Tengen, and Kisei, to add to his Judan title, and so he now held four of the top five. This achievement ranks as one of the top three in postwar go, joining Sakata's six out of seven titles in 1964 and Cho's top four in 1983. Kobayashi also created a record by becoming the first player to challenge for four titles in a row.

In contrast, Cho now found himself without a title to his name, for the first time in eight years. It must have been all the more galling to have his reign at the top terminated by his main rival. However, it is worth bearing in mind that while his achievements already equal or surpass those of the other top players still active, he does not turn 30 until July this year. We have

just seen the completion of the first stage of his career.

(Kisei report translated by John Power.)




'Genmyo' (mystery, reconditeness) – calligraphy by Kobayashi Koichi.

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Ishida Yoshio


We are all only too well aware of the disastrous mistakes that lose us games, but to the professional eye the typical amateur game is more notable for small mistakes in style and in tactical thinking. The accumulation of small losses throughout a game may be just as costly as a big mistake.

In this series, Ishida Yoshio runs some typical amateur mistakes through his computer and comes up with numerical values for them. When you know how much a habitual mistake is costing you, it may be easier to avoid making it.




Mistake 3

Black 1 and 3 show that Black is anxious about the safety of his corner position. He is blind to the damage that he is inflicting on his stone on the other side. This is a common beginner's mistake. How many points does it lose?



Mistake 4

Black sacrifices a stone in order to link up on the side. This is not as bad a mistake as the previous one, but even so giving White the ponnuki loses points. How many points?




Mistake 5

Black 2 is aggressive but is not to be recommended. If you can diagnose what is wrong with it, you are probably a shodan.

Answers on page 28.


Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Answers



Pattern 3: Black loses about 10 points

Black 1 by itself is not a bad move, but when Black continues with 3, permitting White 4, he gets a very bad result. His attitude is too negative: he is just worrying about the eye-shape of his corner group. Black 1 and 3 do not add much to his territory, but they hurt Black's position on the other side. At first I was tempted to call this a 20-point loss, in the hope of shocking beginners out of making this mistake, but I've temporized and called it a 10-point loss. Even now, the kind of player who would play 1 and 3 would still be worried about his corner, so next —




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. He would probably lock up the corner with Black 1. The territory he secures is about 15 points, but the two marked stones by themselves would have been worth about 10 points, so Black 1 here has only gained about 5 points. I assess the loss from strengthening White and isolating the black stone on the outside at 15 points. That's why I consider Black's loss to be 10 points.


Some readers might object that the isolated black stone still has some life in it. In other words, Black has just made White heavy and aims at attacking him with 'a' or 'b'. There is something in this reasoning; White would indeed find Black 'a' or 'b' a nuisance. In this case, the value of Black's loss has to be greatly reduced. That is why I say the loss is 'about' 10 points. The only problem is that a player

strong enough to think of attacking with 'a' or 'b' would never play 1 and 3 in Pattern 3 to begin with.

Dia. 2. Once having played 1, Black should at least continue by cutting at 3. This is an excellent combination. Next —




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. If White 1, Black counter-attaris with 2, his aim being to seal White in on the edge with 4. White has to crawl at 5, so Black gets overwhelming thickness on the outside. If he gets a chance to take the ko later, his thickness will become even more impressive. From a professional standpoint, this result is just a little slack for Black, but in a handicap game it has the great virtue of simplifying the game. Black's loss could be assessed at 1 point.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Just for reference, Black 1 and 3 here are also moves that you should never play. The damage caused to the marked stone costs Black 15 points.




Pattern 4: Black loses 5 points

This is a mistake one sometimes sees even in the games of high kyu and dan players. The difference from Dia. 3 in Pattern 3 is that Black gives White a ponnuki in the centre, so his sin is that much greater. The proverb to the contrary, however, White does not gain 30 points. It is actually extremely difficult to pin down the exact numerical value of Black's loss.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1. White gets thickness, but because of the gap at 'a' that thickness is not formidable. Even if White played 'a' next, Black could be satisfied to close off the corner with 'b'. At the right time, he could take the ko at 'c', then build thickness by turning at 'd'. Taking these factors into consideration, I assess the loss at 5 points. The value of White's ponnuki and Black's negative approach are deducted from the profit Black takes.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. The drawback of this pattern for Black is that White can invade the corner with 1. If he invades immediately, however, Black is not worried, as he can answer with 2 to 8. In this result, White's ponnuki is starting to feel some chilly winds blowing, so finding the right timing for the invasion is not easy for White. Black 4


at 'a', permitting White 'b', would be even more negative than Black's earlier play.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. This position is admittedly nonsense, but let's assume that in a six-stone handicap game the same sequence is played in four places. Even now, the overall result is not bad for Black. As long as there are the gaps at 'a', 'b', 'c', and 'd', White can't turn the whole centre of the board into his territory. Black can also nibble away at White with 'e' etc. Black has lost 20 points (5 points in four places), but he has gained by simplifying the game.


If you want to get stronger, it's better not to imitate Pattern 4. However, there may be exceptions when it's playable.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. In this position, attaching at 2 is a very good move. So far from losing 5 points, it would score 100%. To continue —

Dia. 5 (next page). Even though White gets a ponnuki with 1 to 5, it is too close to his other strong position, so it feels a little overconcentrated. The profit and security that Black gains from linking up make this a very good result for him.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. The textbooks give Black 'a' as the answer for when White invades with the marked stone. The ordinary move of 'b' is also good enough; alternatively, Black could defend the top left with the iron pillar of 'c'. There are any number of good moves, which is all the more reason to avoid the bad moves of Pattern 3 and 4 (i.e. 'd' and 'e').




Pattern 5: Black loses 5 points


White has submissively run along the edge to secure his group. Aggressively pursuing him with 1 is crude; it's the kind of move middle and high kyu players who rely on brute force often play. I assess it as a 5-point loss.

Dia. 1. White of course answers with 1, so the sequence to 6 is forced. Next —

Dia. 2. White 1 will be sente. White 'a' will probably also be sente. Black gains about 15 points from capturing the three marked stones. That may make the result sound good for him, but you have to take into account the loss involved in giving White a ponnuki. If Black had done nothing at all, he would have had the po-



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


tential to make 20 points in the top left area. However, when White makes an approach move at 'b', he can expect nothing. To gain 15 points in Dia. 2, he threw away 20 points, which is why I say he lost 5 points in Pattern 5.

Dia. 3. This diagram shows the wrong way for White to answer the marked black move. The 1—3 combination is even worse style than Black's move. White is in trouble after Black 4 and 6. White 7 is the only move, but —

Dia. 4. Black crawls with 1 etc., then comes




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

back to capture White with 13. His loss in the upper left corner is now trivial. White has to follow Dia. 1.




Dia. 5


Dia. 5. In a handicap game with five stones or more, turning at 1 would be more than good enough. Black can afford to be magnanimous because White has made such dreadful shape with the marked stone; he's content with blocking White off from the centre. Tenuki would also be a good strategy. If you try to be greedy as in Dia. 1, you only turn the tables on yourself.

Dia. 6. If Black is more concerned with the top left, he could make shape with 1. White will probably play 2, but Black is quite happy with his position after 3 and 5. White is not yet alive.

Dia. 7. If White answers at 2, Black 3 is nasty. If White 4, permitting Black to seal him in with



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

5 is unbearable, but if White plays 4 at 5, Black 'a' makes miai of 'b' and 4.


Black 1 in Dias. 6 and 7 is the kind of move you play in an even game or a two- or three-stone handicap game. Whether you play it or 1 in Dia. 5 or just tenuki is up to you.

(*'Let's Go'*, February 1985)

Three Trick Moves


Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan

In this issue, we look at three trick variations of one of the most popular josekis. The chances are that sooner or later you will run into one of these trick moves, so it may be just as well to learn how to handle them.



1. Black to play


The usual joseki is White 2 at 3. How should Black deal with this variation?



2. Black to play

White follows the joseki with 2, but then plays another trick move with 4 and 6.

Answers on page 32.



3. Black to play


White 4 here is a trick move not seen very often. What is the best answer?

Three Trick Moves: Answers


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is timid. Black can live in the corner with 3 and 5, but he lets White take complete control of the outside. This is a failure for Black.


Dia. 2. Black 1 and 3 look like a tesuji, but the problem is that White can just capture these stones with 4 and 6. If 'nen Black 7, White answers at 8, and Black has no effective way of continuing the attack.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: bad



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: variation


Dia. 3. Simply extending at 1 is the best and simplest move. Changing the timing makes all the difference. If White 2, Black discards the corner and builds thickness with 3 and 7. Black can attach at 'a' later, so this result is even.

Dia. 4. If White 2, Black keeps the corner; up to 7 he secures life without giving White a free hand on the outside. He should be able to handle the fight after 8 and 9.

Dia. 5. Black 1 is also a tesuji. It is not bad, but it leads to difficulties when White fights back with 2 and 4. A very complicated fight follows after 12.




Dia. 5: complicated




Dia. 1: too generous

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. You should not sacrifice unless you get adequate compensation. This Black fails to do:



Dia. 2: weak on the outside




Dia. 3: correct

his outside group is still insecure and open to attack after 1 and 3.


Dia. 2. It's quite easy to live in the corner if Black wants to, but White 6 puts a lot of pressure on his stones on the outside. If 7, White 8 is a clever follow-up. Black has been tricked.

Dia. 3. If Black is going to sacrifice his corner stones, adding a stone to the sacrifice with 1 gives him a much more effective sequence. After Black 3 —

Dia. 4. Black gets a good result up to 4, as he takes a firm grip on the marked white stone. Compare this result to Dia. 1. White's corner territory looks big, but he has some bad aji.




Dia. 4: an effective sacrifice




Dia. 5: bad aji

Dia. 5. If White does not reinforce, Black can set up a ko with 1 to 7. This would be a terrible ko for White.



Dia. 1: White gains




Dia. 2: good for White


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. One's first instinct is to attach at 1. Black takes hold of the solitary white stone, but White captures the corner and pokes his head out along the side with 4, so his result is superior.

Dia. 2. If Black 1 and 3, White has the tesuji of 4. Black can live in the corner but at the



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: even

cost of weakening his outside stones and exposing them to attack.

Dia. 3. The combination of 1 and 3 is the best answer. White's first priority is to look after his two stones to the right, so he does not have time to defend at the bottom. Next —

Dia. 4. If White 1, Black plays his follow-up tesuji of 2. White's hane at 7 is essential, so



Dia. 5: bad for White

Black gets excellent thickness with two pon-nukis.


Dia. 5. If White continues after Dia. 3 by attaching at 1, Black 2 works even better than in Dia. 4. Black 4 is sente, so Black gets superb outside thickness up to 6. Black has taken ample compensation for his two lost stones.

(*'Let's Go'*, August 1984)

Tesuji Magic


Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan

The tesuji problems below require a leap of the imagination to solve, but they should be within the reach of kyu-level players who are prepared to put their minds to solving them. If the obvious move doesn't work, try changing the timing.




1. Black to play

Can you find a way to rescue the eight black stones?




2. White to play

If White does not capture the four black stones, he will lose two four-stone groups of his own.




3. Black to play

Black to kill White. How does he destroy White's eye on the side? A ko is not good enough.



4. Black to play

Black seems to be handicapped by the lack of liberties for his two stones on the edge, but there is a vital point for killing White.



5. White to play


White would like to wrest a couple of stones away from the black group. A ko is good enough.

Answers on page 35

Good Style and Correct Shape

Rin Kaiho


In this series Rin Kaiho analyses the elements that make up good style and correct shape in a number of basic patterns. The theme of the series is how to use this knowledge to defend correctly. The aim is not to give you sequences to memorize but to help you develop your feel for the game so that you will be able to find the correct move instinctively.



Problem 3. White to play

The aim of 1 is to expand Black's moyo in sente. The question is how should White answer it. If he does nothing, Black will attach at 'a', forcing White to submit at 'b'. This is painful, so usually White plays something.

Answers on page 38



Problem 4. Black to play


White 1 is a big move at any time, but all the more so when, as here, it is the crucial point for either side to make a base. The marked white stone is unable to escape, but that does not mean Black should ignore White. What is the best defensive move?

Semeai Problems

Rin Kaiho

In both the problems on the right, it is Black's turn to play. Can you find the move for Black to win the semeai?

Answers on page 37




Tesuji Magic: Answers


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 and 3 are signs of mental bankruptcy. Black gets nowhere.


Dia. 2. The throw-in at 3 at least shows that Black is trying, but he still loses the semeai. Instead of 5 —




Dia. 1: hopeless



*Dia. 2: failure
6: connects*



Dia. 3: White escapes




Dia. 4: correct timing

Dia. 3. Switching to 1 here does not work.


Dia. 4. Black must begin by playing inside at 1. Now Black 5 becomes the vital point. Next —

Dia. 5. If White captures at 1, Black ataris at 2. Next —

Dia. 6. White can't connect at 4, so he has to cut at 1, but this lets Black get a ko with 2 and 4. This is the correct answer.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6: best for Black


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Trying to capture Black with White 1 is too slow. Black 2 captures the four stones on the side.


Dia. 2. If White 1, Black gets enough liberties to win the semeai at the bottom.

Dia. 3. White tries 1, but he has no answer to Black 2. Black wins the semeai with the stones on the right side.


Dia. 4. Attaching at 1 is the only way to win the fight.




Dia. 1: too slow




Dia. 2: too slow




Dia. 3: too slow



Dia. 4: correct



Dia. 5: White squeezes



*Dia. 6: success
8: connects*


Dia. 5. If Black 2, White connects at 3. If Black 4, White plays 5 and squeezes, winning the semeai. If Black 4 at 6, White again sets up a squeeze by cutting to the right of 6. After 6 —

Dia. 6. White finishes off the group with 1 and 3. Black cannot escape with 4, as White squeezes again with 5 and sets up a geta.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. If Black saves his three stones by capturing with 1 and 3, then —


Dia. 2. White gets a ko with 1 to 5. Black can do better.




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: ko



Dia. 3: the tesuji



Dia. 4: sacrifice



Dia. 5: dead


Dia. 3. If Black racks his brains a little, he may come up with the clever move of 1. Next —

Dia. 4. If White ataris with 2, Black sacrifices an extra stone with 3. After 4 —


Dia. 5. Black destroys the eye by playing inside at 1.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. The instinctive move is Black 1, but it does not work. Black has just helped White to live up to 6. Instead of 3 —



Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: alive

Dia. 2. Black 3 does not work either, as White has the clever answer at 4. Next —


Dia. 3. The best that Black can do is to get a seki in gote. Instead of 1 —

Dia. 4. Black 1 and 3 fail to kill White.


Dia. 5. The placement at 1 also fails. White




Dia. 3: seki




Dia. 4: alive



Dia. 5: alive



Dia. 6: the vital point




Dia. 7: dead




lives up to 6. If instead Black plays 1 at 5, White 4 guarantees White two eyes. Black 1 is not the vital point.

Dia. 6. The blind spot arises from the fact that the two black stones on the side can immediately be put into atari. Black should ignore this and attach at 1. This is the vital point.

Dia. 7. If White 2, Black kills him with 3 and 5. Actually Black 3 at 4 would also kill White. Instead of 2 —



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Dia. 8. If White 2, Black plays 3, and White cannot stop him from linking up on the edge.


Dia. 9. If White 2, Black simply pushes through at 3. Once Black takes the vital point of 1, White is helpless.

Answer to Problem 5


Dia. 1. This problem is by no means an easy one. If you found a way to capture a couple of




Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 9: wrong for Black




black stones, you did very well. First of all, White tries the 1-3 combination. Next —

Dia. 2. If Black 1, White makes the placement at 2. Unfortunately, White runs out of steam after Black 3.


Dia. 3. It's obvious that 1 and 3 lead nowhere, but —

Dia. 4. What if White had already made the White 'a'—Black 'b' exchange? In that case, Black would not be able to answer White 1 at 2. This observation provides a valuable hint for finding the correct answer.

Dia. 5. Taking the hint from Dia. 4, White starts out with the placement at 1. If Black answers at 2, White is able to set up a ko with 3 to 7. Note the careful timing of 5.




Dia. 5: correct




Dia. 6: ko

Dia. 6. Black may try to trick White by connecting at 2, but if White plays 3 to 7 in the right order, Black cannot avoid the ko. Instead of 5 —

Dia. 7. White 1 here would be a mistake. When the 1-2 exchange has been made first, Black can answer 3 by capturing at 4. Timing is all-important.




Dia. 7: wrong for White




Dia. 8: wrong for Black

Dia. 8. Black 2 (instead of 6 in Dia. 6) is a mistake. White connects at 3 and captures the corner unconditionally.

Dia. 9. Answering 1 at 2 does not work. When



Dia. 10: no ko



Dia. 11: no ko

White ataris at 5, Black can't connect. Black would have to play 4 at 5, giving up the three stones.


Dia. 10. Blocking at 2 doesn't work either. White plays 3 to reduce Black's liberties, then hanes at 5. Black can't atari, so White captures the two corner stones unconditionally.

Dia. 11. Black 2 is also doomed to failure. White has to capture something with 3.


The conclusion is that Black has no answer to the placement at 1 in Dia. 5.

(*'Let's Go'*, August 1984)

Semeai Problems: Answers



1



2

Answer to Problem 1

Simply descending at 1 is the answer. Whatever White does, he loses the semeai, as the reader may like to confirm for himself. If Black 1 at 'a', White plays 1 and gets a ko.

Answer to Problem 2

Black 1 is a clever move. Even if White makes the placement at 1, Black wins the semeai by one move.


(*'Kido'*, January—March 1985)

Good Style and Correct Shape Continued from page 34


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1 (impudent). White would like to be able to answer at 1, but this is a bit impudent.


Dia. 2. Black can attach at 1. If White resists, he meets with disaster.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: disaster



Dia. 3: wrong



Dia. 4: correct


Dia. 3. (a fake move). White 1 and 3 seem to achieve the same result as Dia. 1 while forestalling Black's counter in Dia. 2, but White 1 is a fake. Apart from the drawback of strengthening Black with 2, it gives him the threat of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. The 1-3 combination is to be avoided.

Dia. 4 (the proper move). The honest answer is White 1. It may look a little too solid, but it eliminates all of White's bad aji and makes it easy for White to aim at reducing Black's moyo with 'a' or 'b'. Any other move runs the risk of falling between two stools.


Dia. 5 (gote). White 1 tries for more but achieves less. White has to answer Black 'a' at 'b', so he becomes overconcentrated while giving Black increased thickness.

Dia. 6 (a bad exchange). White 1 is also just so much wasted effort. It may have eliminated the threat of Black 'a' but at the cost of giving Black superb thickness with 2. White loses a lot on the exchange; tenuki would be better.

The proper move in Dia. 4 may appear slow, but actually it is the most efficient move.




Dia. 5: bad




Dia. 6: bad

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1 (tenuki). The first possibility to look at is a tenuki by Black. Tenuki is possible, of course, but White's forcing move at 1 is rather painful. If White later slides to 'a', Black loses his base and his whole group comes under attack.




Dia. 1: tenuki




Dia. 2: too slow

Dia. 2 (slack). Defending with 1 is extremely submissive. Black may have intended to play solidly, but actually after White 'a', White can again put the whole group on the run with 'b'.

Dia. 3 (submissive). Black 1 looks like a tough answer, but actually it gives White a good sente move at 2.




Dia. 3: gote



Dia. 4: correct shape

Dia. 4 (best). Playing at the corner of the white stone with 1 is the most efficient answer. The advantage of this move is that after 3 Black



Dia. 5: success

Dia. 6

Dia. 7: too solid

Dia. 8: efficient

threatens to take away White's base by crawling at 'a', so compared to Dias. 1 and 3, the tables have been turned on White. However, blocking at 'a' would give Black sente, making him very satisfied.

Dia. 5 (objective accomplished). If White blocks at 2, Black can switch elsewhere, as he has succeeded in forestalling White 'a' (Black counters with 'b'). If White omits 2, then Black looks forward to crawling at the same point.

Dia. 6 (illustration). White 1 aims at crawling at 'a'. How should Black dispose of this threat?

Dia. 7 (too solid). Black 1 is solid, but a better word might be stolid. Later White should be able to exchange 'a' for Black 'b'.

Dia. 8. Playing at the corner is again the most efficient move. If White 'a', Black will have forestalled White 'b' in sente.

(*'Kido'*, February 1986)

Amateur Honinbo v. Professional Honinbo

The half dozen top amateurs in Japan are generally considered to be about professional 5- or 6-dan in strength. They are players who could have become professionals if they had not chosen to follow other careers. Some of them can give even the top professionals a close game and on occasion pull off an upset.

That is what happened in last year's match between the amateur and professional Honinbos. Shortly after winning the amateur title in August (the final is given in the 1986 Ranka Yearbook), Nakazono Seizo, with the help of a small handicap, managed to breach the defences of the professional title-holder, Takemiya Masaki. The game was a very interesting one, so we present it below.

White: Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo

Black: Nakazono Seizo, Amateur Honinbo

Komi: Black receives a 5-point komi.

Time: 1½ hours each.

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *Unorthodox moyo strategy*

White 10, 12, 14. It's safe to say that this is the first time that this strategy has been employed against the Chinese-style pattern.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White just wants to create some aji in the corner with 14 before setting up his moyo. The technique he employs to do the latter, the shoulder-hit at 20, is not exactly orthodox either.

Black 25. The natural continuation on the left is Black 'a', but perhaps the prospect of a Takemiya moyo with 'b' or 'c' was too disturbing. Fighting spirit leads the players to go

their separate ways with 27 and 28. A spectator could be forgiven for wondering where White intends to get his territory.

Black 35. Black 46 would be more solid, but Black decides to compete in the centre, though this is a little risky.

Black does not have two eyes after White 48, but he launches a counterattack with 49.




Figure 2 (51 - 125)
67: ko; 70: ko; 122: ko

Figure 2 (51 - 125). Two furikawaris

The result to 63 is a ko, but each side only has one absolute ko threat, so Black has to be content with 71 to 75. Note that Black 71 at 74 would be risky, as White could extend at 71, making Black 74 mochikomi (a loss without compensation).


Black 75. Nakazono commented later that it would have been better aji to extend at 83. White makes skilful use of the twin threats of living in the corner and on the side. After 92, one can judge the result of the furikawari (exchange) involved in the ko fight. Takemiya thought that he was a little ahead.

White 94. Takemiya decided against the furikawari of Dia. 1.


Black 97, 99. A miscalculation — Nakazono thought that the capture would be sente, threatening a ko after Black 'a'.

White 110. Better at 'b'.

White 112. This reinforcement is not really necessary; White should switch to 120. Nonetheless, the result of the second ko furikawari is reasonable for White.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 3 (126 - 213)
113: connects (at 74)

Figure 3 (126 - 213). Victory for the amateur

White 28. The losing move. White should play 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, forcing Black to add stones to remove the captured white stones from the board. Actually, finding the right move to defend at the top would not be easy for Black. Note that Black 2 at 3 would be dangerous because of White 'a'. With 31, Black takes the lead.

White 36. This simple move was overlooked by Nakazono, but his mistake was not fatal.

White 50. For the first time Takemiya counted up the score and realized, to his dismay, that he was behind. Nakazono had known he was ahead since he played 31, so for once an amateur's positional judgement was better than the professional's.


'Giving a komi with White throws your intuition off,' Takemiya muttered after the game. However, Takemiya took a liking to Nakazono's unfidgety style of go and said that he hoped to play him again the following year.

Black wins by 7½ points.


The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. White has just attached with the triangled stone in the lower left corner, and three proposals are being made for Black's next move. Which one do you think fits the fuseki best?



Dia. A



Dia. B



Dia. C


A: The inside hane at 1 is a determined move. After the exchange of 2 and 3, Black's strength in the upper left comes to life. Black ought to be able to build a nice moyo at the bottom.

B: I see nothing wrong with the usual hane on the outside. If you take a look at the whole board, you ought to realize that it's enough to put Black on the road to victory without exposing him to any risks.

C: Both of you are missing the point. Black wants to build outside strength, so he pushes down at 1 and cuts at 3. Black 3 is a nice little sacrifice that locks White into the corner.

Fuseki Analysis

Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (fuseki diagram, next page), the positions on the left side and at the bottom will determine the choice of joseki.




Fuseki Diagram

In the upper left corner, a variation of the taisha joseki in which White takes the corner territory and Black gets outside influence with a ponnuki has been played. Black can consider using this thickness to build a moyo or to start a fight, but only the latter makes sense in this fuseki because the moyo would be open at 'a'.

In the bottom right corner, Black has a corner enclosure whose direction of development is toward the stones at the bottom left. His first thought should be to build influence so that he can expand the bottom.

Black's choice of joseki in this issue's fuseki must therefore have two aims: (1) It must use the influence in the upper left by drawing



Dia. 1


White into a fight and (2) it must allow Black to expand the bottom.

A Wins the Debate


The inside hane at 1 in Dia. 1 is made to order for the fuseki. Before seeing why, we will look at the joseki in isolation.

This issue's joseki arises from a white approach at 1 in Dia. 2 against a black stone on the five-four point. When Black goes for the outside with 2, White attaches at 3. Black can then choose 'a', 'b', or 'c' for his next move.

The hane at 'a', which builds influence along the side and toward the center, is the usual move. The move at 'b' is similar to 'a'.




Dia 2




Dia. 3

The inside hane at 'c' (1 in Dia. 3), however, precipitates a fight. After White 2 and Black 3, White normally answers at 4 and 6 in Dia. 4, but if the ladder at 'a' in Dia. 5 is good for him, he can also extend at 6. In Dia. 4, White accepts the invitation to fight, whereas in Dia. 5 he settles for a peaceful result. The advantage of Dia. 5 is that there are few variations, but the disadvantage is that White has compromised and, in the local context at least, gets the short end of the stick.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

After White 6 in Dia. 5, Black's only move is the cut at 7 in Dia. 6. White usually settles the shape with 8 and 10, although he may want to leave the White 8—Black 9 exchange unplayed to leave himself the forcing move at 'a'.

Since the prerequisite for playing this variation is a ladder favorable for White, Black cannot



Dia. 6




Dia. 7


escape at 12. He therefore cuts at 11 and, when White captures at 12, ataris at 13 in Dia. 7. White can either leave the position as it is or extend up the side to 'a'. He does not connect at 'b', since Black will only extend to 'c'.

The result to 13 gives Black a large profit, so he is satisfied. Note also that Black can omit 11 in Dia. 6 if he can play an effective ladder block.

The joseki that develops from 1 and 3 in Dia. 8 is a complicated, large-scale joseki. It will be easier to give the order of moves first before discussing the meaning of the moves and taking up the possible variations.




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

After Dia. 8, Black ataris at 4 in Dia. 9 and crawls at 6. When White extends at 7, Black extends at 8 in Dia. 10. White plays a forcing move at 9, then jumps out to 11. Black plays from above at 12, and White, before going to work at the bottom, strengthens his three stones on the side with 13.




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Since 13 threatens to kill his group, Black makes life in the sequence to 18 in Dia. 11. At



Dia. 12




Dia. 13


the bottom, White, who has up to this point been following a sabaki strategy, must now set about ensuring the life of his own group. White 19 is the proper move, which Black answers by blocking at 20. After throwing in a cut at 25 in Dia. 12, White achieves his aim with 27 in Dia. 13.

Black 26 in Dia. 13 is the correct response to the cut at 25 in Dia. 12. Black then gets a ladder with 28 (if it is not favorable for him, he gets a bad result) and captures at 30 when White extends up the side to 29. This concludes the joseki.


Dias. 14 to 16 review the order of moves. Our next task is to highlight some of the more important variations.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16




Dia. 17


Instead of the one-space jump at 13 in Dia. 15, White can also play the diagonal move of 1 in Dia. 17. Since the placement at 'a' kills Black,

he lives with the sequence to 6. White then plays 7, and the joseki continues as before. Which of the variations White chooses of course depends on the surrounding positions.

Blocking at 1 in Dia. 18 also threatens to kill Black, but it is heavy. In contrast to Dias. 15 and 17, White does not develop as quickly up the side.




Dia. 18




Dia. 19

Another possibility for White 19 in Dia. 15 is the diagonal move at 1 in Dia. 19. Black usually answers at 2. White 3 next in Dia. 20 is not good because after White 7 Black can pincer around 'a' or continue to press with 'b'. White therefore backtracks to 3 in Dia. 21, and the sequence to 7 follows.




Dia. 20




Dia. 21

If Black wants to attack the stones on the left, he can switch 2 in Dia. 19 to 2 in Dia. 22. White moves out with 3, and Black pincers at 4.


White 1 in Dia. 23 is a bad mistake. Black hanes strongly at 2, and White has his hands full. If he hanes at 3 in Dia. 24, Black attaches at 4. White can maintain his connection with 5, but in the sequence to 11 in Dia. 25 he is forced into an un-




Dia. 22



Dia. 23




Dia. 24




Dia. 25

bearably low position. It may even be possible, depending on what the position is to the right, for Black to continue the attack at 'a'.


Pushing up at 3 in Dia. 26, instead of making the hane, is no better. White thrashes about with 5 and 7, but if he connects at 9 in Dia. 27, he is in for a nasty surprise when Black jumps in at 10. After 12 in Dia. 28, Black squeezes through 17 in Dia. 29 and is one liberty ahead in the semeai with the hane at 18.




Dia. 26



Dia. 27




Dia. 28




Dia. 29


Another interesting point comes up when Black blocks at 24 in Dia. 16, or 1 in Dia. 30. If White answers simply at 2, Black gets sente after Black 3 and White 4. As shown earlier, however, White throws in the cut at 2 in Dia. 31 before




Dia. 30



Dia. 31




Dia. 32



White extends to 2. The result, however, is not quite good enough.

When this issue's joseki is played out in the fuseki in the Fuseki Diagram, White lives with the marked white stone in Dia. 41 (previous page) and Black grasps the white cutting stone with the marked black stone (the ladder favors Black). White's only move is to extend to 1, but it is painful: not only has it no effect on Black, it has no potential for expansion. Black's capture at 2, on the other hand, gives him an ideal moyo at the bottom and an excellent follow-up at 'a'. Since White would be in serious trouble after Black 'a', he extends to 3. Next, 4 gives Black a decided advantage. (Surrounding territory with 'b' also seems possible.)


If White switches 1 in Dia. 41 to 1 in Dia. 42 to prevent Black from getting a moyo at the bottom, the term 'tough spot' hardly describes his position after Black 4. Black is satisfied.




Dia. 42

B's Proposal

B proposed blocking at 1 in Dia. 43. It is a straightforward move and results in the basic




Dia. 43




Dia. 44

joseki pattern to 4. Black has the option of playing 3 at 'a', and White the option of omitting 4. If White does omit 4, Black can force directly with 1 in Dia. 44, or jump down to 1 in Dia. 45, aiming at a squeeze with the placement at 'a'. Since any reply White makes is submissive, he plays elsewhere.


If Black chooses this joseki for the fuseki (Dia. 46), not much can be said about it one way or the other except that it is rather spiritless



Dia. 45



Dia. 46



Dia. 47


with the side open at 'a'. Black can of course close off the side with 'a', making a considerable territory there, but it would just be a territory-making move lacking any subtlety. Black will probably play 5 instead and come back to the large point at 7. If White then takes the large point at 8, the game will settle down to a drawn-out affair.

White can also consider omitting 4 in Dia. 46 to take the initiative on the right side at 4 in Dia. 47. Black 5 and White 6 are the likely moves, but here, too, Black has missed his chance to turn the game in his favor.


C's Proposal

C proposed pushing down at 1 in Dia. 48 and cutting at 3 — a solid way of playing. Next, White 4 in Dia. 49 is the only move. Black increases the sacrifice with 5, then plays forcing moves with 7, 9, and 11 in Dia. 50. The joseki ends when he protects the cutting point with 13 in Dia. 51. (White will often settle the shape immediately by exchanging 'a' for 'b'.)


Note that White 4 in Dia. 52 is unreasonable.




Dia. 48




Dia. 49




Dia. 50



Dia. 51




Dia. 52




Dia. 53

Black descends at 5 in Dia. 53, forcing White to crawl at 6, then plays the severe two-step hane at 7 and 9. White tries to take the corner with 10 and 12 in Dia. 54, but Black's placement at 15 in Dia. 55 turns the corner into a ko in which it is Black's turn to take.




Dia. 54



Dia. 55

In the fuseki in Dia. 56, Black has just protected the cutting point with the marked stone. Although Black has fine thickness with no defects, White also has a corner so solid that there is not even one ko threat against it. White takes sente to play 1, and the game goes sour for Black. Even though he blocks at 'a', he cannot expect to make an overwhelming territory because of White 'b'. The opening is favorable for White.



Dia. 56

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, March 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)

10th Gosei Title

1985 was the year of Kobayashi Koichi and Takemiya Masaki, but the achievement of Otake Hideo in defending the Gosei title should not be overlooked. He has now held this title for six years in a row, has won it for seven out of the ten terms of its existence and has appeared in nine out of the ten title matches (for details, see GW39, page 55). This kind of domination of a title would be unique but for the fact that Otake won all five terms of the All-Japan Number One Position Title, which was the predecessor of the Gosei title.

His opponent in this title match was Kudo Norio, a solid player two years his senior (born in 1940) who was the challenger for the 5th and final term of the above title (he lost 1–2). His major tournament success has been winning the Oza title from Cho Chikun in 1977 (see GW6). He has also played in the Meijin league three times and the Honinbo league once and is known for his steady, thick style. He was in superb form in the first half of last year and his record up to July was 11–1. However, he could not have gone into the title match with much confidence, for he seems to be jinxed by Otake: he lost his last twelve games in a row against him.

Game One

White: Otake Hideo Gosei

Black: Kudo Norio 9-dan

Played on 4 July 1985 in Sendai City.

Commentary by Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 19 is joseki, but it is dubious as it gives White the perfect shoulder hit at 28. Black should play the high move at 29 or, better, 28, which sets up a good follow-up at 'a'.

Black 21. Black could also consider ignoring 20 in order to press at 26. After White 'b' through 'f', Black 'g' would complete a nice framework. That in turn implies that Otake should have played 20 at 26 immediately, but perhaps, knowing Kudo's preference for creating solid positions early, Otake was confident that he would answer 20.

Black 27. If at 30, White is happy to cap at 27.

Black 33. A forceful attempt to change the flow of the game. If the conventional move at 'h', White gets a comfortable position with 'i'.

White 38. Otake falters a little in the face of Kudo's attack. Apparently, descending at 'j' is superior to 38. When Black secures centre influence up to 41, he has recovered from his bad start.

White 50. Necessary, as Black is threatening to attack with 'k', White 'l', Black 'm'.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 51. Simply extending at 'a' looks good enough, but Kudo plays more boldly.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

99: ko

White 52. The trade is inevitable. If White plays 52 at 53, he has no answer to Black 52. However, Black seems to give up too much in the corner. It will be hard to take sufficient compensation with 57 and 59.

White 66. Bad shape, perhaps, but if White 'b', Black gets a forcing move at 85.

Black 69, 71. The losing moves, according to Kudo. These moves are a 'leaning' attack, that is, Black 'leans' on the white stones to the left while really aiming at the group on the right. However, the latter group is fairly secure, so Black is unlikely to get compensation for strengthening White on the left side. Black should omit 69 to 73 and play 75 immediately.

White 84. Compare the result on the left to the position before Black 69. Black has given White so much profit that he can only recoup it by killing White's centre group, but that is not possible.

Black 85. If at 86, White easily lives with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

Black 99. Even if Black wins this ko, White can link up to the bottom left corner.




Figure 3 (101 – 155)

Ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41; 43: connects

Figure 3 (101 – 155)

White 36 and 44 take ample compensation for the ko (and the seven stones White has lost). White may even be a little ahead on the board.

Figure 4 (156 – 212)

In this game, Kudo seems to have been trying




Figure 4 (156 – 212)

79: ko

too hard. His normal style is to play a solid, slow-paced game, but here he was in a hurry to start fighting. Otake didn't have to do anything except wait for his opponent's mistakes.

Incidentally, for Otake this win ended a string of seven losses in title games: the final four games of his 1984 Meijin title match against Cho and the three games of his 1985 Judan title match against Kobayashi.

Black resigns after White 212.



Kudo (to a reporter): 'Just one look at Otake's face and I feel I'm going to lose.'

Game Two

White: Kudo Norio

Black: Otake Hideo

Played on 17 July in Kanazawa City.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 24. Otake: 'White's aim is the contact play at 'a'. If he gets a chance to play there, the game will be interesting for him.' Hence Black 25, which disturbs the peaceful flow of the game so far.

White 32. The ordinary move at 35 lets Black get away too easily.

White 42. Otake: 'I think this should be at 'b'.' Without the reinforcement at 46, Black 'd' (he first exchanges 'c' for White 'b') forces White to scramble for eyes.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 59. Black could secure the left side




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

86: connects

with Black 61, White 'a', Black 'b', but White 'c' would weaken the centre black group. Having destroyed White's area at the top, Otake felt that White was entitled to destroy his area on the side. He commented that he would have found White 58 at 59 more disagreeable (after Black defends, White plays first at the bottom). Switching to 67 keeps the initiative for Black.

The thickness Black builds up to 89 strengthens his top right corner, so White can no longer aim at 'd' (which was the aim of 24 in Figure 1). When Black goes on to secure the bottom with 91 and 93, he takes a big lead.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 15. The game seems to be over, but ...

White 16 defends against Black 'a'.

Black 25 should be at 34. The game becomes much closer when White invades with 26 and 28.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Black 51 shows Otake's fondness for thickness. Another player would probably play at 60.

White 66. White 'a' would lose, but unfortunately for Kudo, Otake can let him live up to 76 as he maintains his lead with 77.

Figure 5 (201 - 254)

When asked the reason for his defeat after the game, Kudo shook his head. 'I really don't know,' he replied ruefully. Yet considering that he gained ten points in Figure 3, he must have been a long way behind before then. His inability to




Figure 4 (151 - 200)




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

34: connects




Figure 5 (201 - 254)

point the finger at a real blunder perhaps indicates that Otake was imperceptibly outplaying him from the start. The only clue is that his fellow professionals felt that 46 in Figure 1 was too slow (it should have been at 55 in Figure 2), but the loss can't be blamed on 46 alone. No wonder Kudo feels jinxed by Otake.

Black wins by 6½ points.


Game Three

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Kudo Norio

Played in Hiroshima City on 31 July 1985.

Commentary by Hayase Hiroshi 9-dan.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 1 to 5 are Kudo's favourite fuseki pattern. The high move at 13 keeps sente: White must play 14 to prevent Black 'a'.

Black 17 could also be at 26 (White would extend along the bottom, below 21).

Black 23. The same move as in the first game. Kudo avoids the usual joseki move of 27 as he does not want White to scoop out his corner with 25. This time Otake does not hane on top (at 27), because, he joked, he didn't want people to think that was the only move he knew.

Black 25. The only move. Black 1 in Dia. 1, giving White the peep at 4, would be unprofessional.

Black 45. A big decision for Kudo. Hayase expected him to attack the group on the side with 1 in Dia. 2 (1 could also be at 3 or 'a'). This attack seems natural after one has built thickness in the centre, but Kudo decided instead to stake the game on a centre moyo.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)
77: connects

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White 54 is a mistake, but probably one that only a professional would make. It is a probe to see whether Black answers at 'a' or 'b', but wisely he does neither. When he plays 55, he takes the lead: this was the key point for expanding both moyos.

Black 65. Aggressive — Black 'c' would be good enough. Black keeps the upper hand in the ensuing fight.




Figure 3 (101 – 157)

Figure 3 (101 – 157)

White 2. White counterattacks, hoping to use the aji of his probe at 92 in Figure 2, but Black

rides out the attack.

White 10. Connecting at 11, forcing Black 16, is more profitable, but White wants to retain the threat of attacking the group at the top by connecting at 50.

White 12. Capturing with 'a' is not worth it — Black plays 'b'.

White 24 is necessary to make a game of it territorially, even though it permits a severe attack at 25.

White 26. If at 46, Black 29 makes miai of attacking the centre group and of 37 at the top.

White 38. If at 'c', Black sacrifices and squeezes (securing his eye shape), then attacks the centre group with 45.

Black 45 kills the group. White can't even get a semeai, as Black lives with 57.

With this win, Kudo not only saved the first kadoban but also, perhaps more important for him, put an end to his losing streak against Otake at 14 losses.

White resigns after Black 157.

Game Four

White: Kudo Norio

Black: Otake Hideo

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 7 August 1985.

Commentary by Otake.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 27 leads the game into an unusual pattern. The standard move is crawling at 32.

White 30 threatens to start a ko with 'a', but

it's a moot point whether it should be played so early in the game.




Figure 2 (51 - 80)

Figure 2 (51 - 80)

White 56. Perhaps the ko should be kept in reserve. The players forget about the ko anyway in the scuffle that starts in the centre.

White 70. To prevent Black 'a'.

Black 75. Otake reproached himself for not making the shoulder hit at 'b' instead.


White 80 is natural. If instead at 'a', Black forces with 'c', then switches to 'd'.

Figure 3 (81 - 126)

White 84. White has no ko threats, so he can't cut at 85. The continuation to 92 is forced, but the result is that the 56-57 exchange in Figure 2 has become a bad one for White. If he starts the ko with 'a', Black simply links up with 99.

White 94. An amateur would expect the peep at 1 in Dia. 1. White captures a stone and lives, but at too great a cost. Black makes ideal shape with 4 to 8, an unbearable result for White.

Black 95, in contrast, looks natural to an



Dia. 1

Dia. 2






Figure 3 (81 - 126)

84: connects; 122: connects



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

amateur but very dubious to a professional. Good style is to play Black 'b'; if then White 96, Black blocks at 'c' and squeezes; if instead White 'd', Black is content to connect at 96.

On seeing 96 and 98, Otake held his head in distress. Instead of 99, he could capture the white group, but then White would squeeze all round the outside. In addition, White 99 would revive the threat of the ko in the bottom right corner.

White 100. Ishida Yoshio, who was following the game on the in-house TV system at the Ki-in, commented: 'White intends to sacrifice the group at the bottom. Black probably won't try to take it.' His prediction was an accurate one.


White 112. If the 'usual' move at 'e', Black 'f' will be disagreeable.

Black 115, 117. A sabaki tesuji. If Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 2, White will build thickness with 2 to 6. Actually this is too good for White, so Black would probably sacrifice two stones with 5 and 7 in Dia. 3.

White 122. White would like to extend at 123

but does not have the ko threats to fight the ko after Black 122.

Black 125. The group is now settled. The ponnuki with 124 and 126 makes White thick, but Kudo called 124 the losing move. He said that he should have played it at 1 in Dia. 4 (previous page), followed by the hane at 3. If then Black 4, White plays another forcing move with 5. He claims that this would have made the game even.



Dia. 5

Dia. 6




Figure 4 (127 – 170)

Figure 4 (127 – 170)

Black 29. At this point Otake read out that he had a win by 7 or 8 points on the board.

Black 31. Otake did not mind letting White save his group with 32 etc., but his judgement was not backed by other professionals (Rin, for example). If Black 1 in Dia. 5, White squeezes with 2 to 6, but even so capturing the white group is big. White would have to defend at 8 next, so Black could switch to 'a' in the figure for a result a little better than that in the game.

White 38. The choice between 38 and 'b' at the top is not an easy one. If the latter, Black can invade with 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'.

White 48. Another difficult decision. White could first reduce the black group below to one eye with White 'f' through Black 'j', but this sequence loses a point, so White is understandably reluctant to play it.

Figure 5 (171 – 220)

Black 77. If at 1 in Dia. 6, White plays a ko after 2 and 4.




Figure 5 (171 – 220)

Ko: 78, 81, 84




Figure 6 (221 – 299)

Ko: 29, 32, 35; 36: connects (below 24); 56: ko (at 26); ko (over 58): 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79; ko (right of 26): 83, 86, 89; 91: connects (at 26); 93: connects (left of 31); 95: connects (right of 49); 97: ko (below 94)

White 86. White wins the ko, but Black takes compensation with 87. The game is very close, but Black is still ahead. Otake commented that there was no chance of an upset after 107.

Figure 6 (221 – 299)

Kudo must have been disappointed with his defeat in the title match, but he did not show

it. He had made Otake work for his win in this game and above all he had redeemed himself in the third game. It seems that other players just have to accept that the Gosei title is Otake's personal property.

Black wins by 3½ points.

(Translated by John Power)

33rd Oza Title

Just about the only real setback Kobayashi suffered last year, apart from his loss to Takemiya in the Honinbo League playoff, was the defeat inflicted on him by Kato in the Oza title match. In recent years Kato has had the same kind of grip on the Oza that Otake has on the Gosei. He has won the Oza in six out of the last seven years, being interrupted only by Hashimoto Shoji in 1981. That was also the last year that he lost a game in this title: since then he has won ten games in a row, defeating Hashimoto 2–0 in 1982, Otake 2–0 in 1983, Yamashiro 3–0 (the title was changed to a best-of-five) in 1984, then Kobayashi 3–0 last year. Kato has slipped a little from the days when he held four titles (Honinbo, Judan, Tengen and Oza in 1979), but by hanging on to the Oza he has avoided falling into the slump that has generally awaited the other multiple title-holders. (The first game of this series was given in GW42.)

Game Two

White: Kato Masao Oza

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Judan

Played in Jozankei spa (near Sapporo) on 9 October 1985. *Commentary by Kato.*




Figure 1 (1 – 65)

Figure 1 (1 – 65)


White 16. White is reluctant to pull back at 17, as after Black 16, White 'a', Black 22, White will have to extend towards a solid black pos-

ition with 'b'. Kato prefers to sacrifice the corner. This leads to the same contest between territory and influence as in the first game.

Black 31. Kobayashi regretted this move, as it gave White a chance to build up his centre with 32 and 34. He should have played immediately at 35. White expands his centre further up to 58.

Black 61, 63. Ignoring a move like 60 indicates how unhappy Black must be with his position. First of all, however, Black 61 and 63 come too late to be effective. Now that White has a lot of influence in the centre, he can answer at 64, as he is not afraid of the cut at 'c'. If Black had played these moves around 35, White would have had no choice but to connect at 'c'.

Black 65. The usual move, of course, is 1 in Dia. 1. Black keeps sente and can switch to 'd' in the figure, but Kobayashi must have concluded that this was not good enough.



Dia. 1





Figure 2 (66 - 135)

84: connects



Dia. 2

Dia. 3

Figure 2 (66 - 135)

White 70 is an overplay: simply pulling back with 88 would be good enough. Black would have to defend at 77, so White could then switch to 99 for a safe lead. Actually Kato overlooked Kobayashi's very clever move at 79, which enables Black to link up in sente. White 74—Black 75 has become a bad exchange for White and he has lost his lead.

Black 91. A slack move: Black should jump to 'a'. White 129 is forced, so Black could next exchange 'b' for White 128. That secures a reserve eye, so he could switch to the bottom left without worrying about his group.

White 96. White has to compromise. If he tries to capture Black with 1 in Dia. 2, then after 2 to 10, he can stop Black from getting two eyes as in Dia. 3. However, Black not only squeezes on the outside but at worst has a ko in the corner. This is out of the question for White.

Figure 3 (136 - 200)

White 40—44. White stakes the game on this ko. Black is only a fraction ahead, so he can't compromise with 'a'. However, he goes wrong




Figure 3 (136 - 200)

with 47. Perhaps Kobayashi overlooked White 50. Capturing a stone with 52 and 54 is bigger than the ko. Instead of 47, Black should have answered at 48. Black could then use 'b' as his ko threat; any other move would give Black too many threats, so White has to answer at 'c', but Black then gains by forcing with 'd'. In fact, he could then afford to give up the ko and compromise with 'a'. As it is, White goes into the lead again.

White 60 should be at 63.

White 78 should be at 95 to forestall the




Figure 4 (201 - 276)

Ko: 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19; 26: connects (at 21); 45: below 31; 76: ko (at 50). Each side connects a ko.

squeeze with 79 etc. Black would have to answer White 95 with 97 to prevent White from attacking the corner (he gets a ko with White 97, Black 'e', White 'f').

Figure 4 (201 – 276)

White 32. It was at this point that Kato first became certain of victory. His centre strategy prevailed almost in spite of himself.

White wins by ½ point.

(*'Kido'*, December 1985)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Kato Masao

Played on 31 October 1985 at Tsurumaki spa in Kanagawa prefecture.





Figure 1 (1 – 50)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 11 is tight: Black wants to avoid the large avalanche joseki of 'a'. White 14 is also conservative. Usually White builds a large moyo with 14 at 25; even after 14, building a moyo with

24, Black 25, White 26 is usual.

White 24. Now that White has played 22, he must prevent Black from destroying his moyo by jumping to 27.

Black 31 to 39 give Black a terrible result: he captures two stones in gote but helps White to complete one wall of his moyo. Having attacked at 31, Black must fight with 33 at 1 in Dia. 1, according to Takemiya. The continuation there is just one possibility. Black 9 makes miai of 'a' and Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd'.

White 40 is big, but Takemiya maintains that White 'b' is even bigger, for it not only secures the corner but also turns the black stones below into a weak, floating group.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 57 and White 58 are both excellent moves. If White omitted the latter move, Black 'a' would be unbearable. With 59, Black could easily go in further at 'b'.

Black 65. Black seems to have been a little overawed by White's boldness in invading at 64. Simply playing 67 would have made it harder for White to settle his group. The result to 80 is good for White.

Black 83 should decide the game. However, Black 91 is a bad mistake: Black could live unconditionally with 1 etc. in Dia. 2. In theory, this is not a living shape after 4, but in this case Black can play 5, which gives him time to live with 9 (if White destroys the eyes with 8, he can't hope to catch Black after Black 'a').




Figure 3 (101 – 165)
Ko: 4, 7, 10

Figure 3 (101 – 165)

White 12. Kobayashi took the lead but only temporarily. All he had to do to win was to secure his bottom area by playing 20 at 46. Black 29 to 39 turned the game around again.

Figure 4 (166 – 235)

The final score of 3–0 in this series was a




Figure 4 (166 – 235)

little unkind to Kobayashi, as the second and third games could easily have gone the other way. However, he was preoccupied with the Meijin title match, being played at the same time (see GW43), and he did take his revenge on Kato in the Kisei playoff at the end of the year.

Black wins by 4½ points.

(Adapted from a commentary by Takemiya in 'Kido', Jan. 1986. Translated by John Power.)

11th Tengen Title

The climax to a very busy year for Kobayashi was his acquisition of his third title. The Tengen was also his third title match in a row and the result made up for his poor showing in the Oza title.

The main factor in this series seems to have been the difference in momentum between the two players. Before the match, Kobayashi had played 43 games and during October and November he played two a week, but when a player is in peak form the more he plays the better he gets. In contrast, Ishida had only played 18 games and of these had only won seven. The lack of recent match play seemed to have a bad effect on him: rather than being outplayed by Kobayashi, he seemed to defeat himself.

Incidentally, this was the first title match between these two (apart from two TV finals, both won by Ishida). In past encounters Ishida led 11–8.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi Judan

Black: Ishida Yoshio Tengen

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Played at the Nagoya branch of the Nihon Ki-in on 16 November 1985. *Commentary by Hane 9-dan.*

Figure 1 (1 – 65)

The game begins with one of the currently popular variations of the large avalanche. The latest wrinkle is playing 26 before 28 (for the other order, see GW41, page 39). If White plays 28 first, then after Black 29, White 26, Black can extend at 30, which is considered bad for White.

Black 33. Defending at 38, a move invented by Okumura 7-dan, is popular at the Nagoya Ki-in.

Black 47 is a turning point. He could also attack at 48.

Black 53 is aggressive. Black could also try




Figure 1 (1 - 65)

to settle his group lightly with Black 'a', White 64, Black 'b'. White welcomes the fight, because he can use his stones in the centre.

White 64. If at 'c', Black will link up with Black 'a', White 64, Black 'b'.




Figure 2 (66 - 130)

100: ko; 102: captures

Figure 2 (66 - 130)

Black 67. Insurance — Black can always live with 'a'.

White 72. If at 'b', not only does Black 'c' become sente but Black can also ignore White 74.

White 80 and 82 are bold moves, aiming at squeezing on a large scale in the centre. Ishida obstinately pushed through with 85 etc., giving

White the squeeze, but he commented later that he should have sacrificed the three stones, switching to 107 to 113. Once Black plays 85, the ko is inevitable, but the resulting trade favours White. Black's capture is worth 24 points to White's 14, but the latter's thickness makes up the difference.

Black 105. Black cannot resist with Black 106, for when White cuts at 105, White 'd' will be sente against the black group on the left.

White 118. If at 122 immediately, Black captures him with 'e'.




Figure 3 (131 - 200)

Ko: 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83; 85: connects; 86: ko; 99: ko

Figure 3 (131 - 200)

White 34 may look like a wide extension, but Kobayashi is prepared to fight when Black invades. He does not have to win the ko: the ponnuki at 88 is enough.






Figure 4 (201 - 256)

Ko: 5, 8, 11; 13: connects; 48: connects

Figure 4 (201 - 256)

Black does not have enough ko threats, so he has to let White eat into his top right corner. Black keeps on fighting but is unable to close the gap.

Black resigns after White 256.

Game Two

White: Ishida Yoshio

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Kurume City, Kyushu, on 29 November 1985. *Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan.*

Figure 1 (1 - 35)


White 2, 4. Vintage Ishida.

White 12-14. These three moves show the rigorousness of modern go. White plays very tightly despite being inside Black's sphere of influence.

White 16 is a new move. Dia. 1 shows the usual joseki.

Black 17. If at 'a', White intends to play 28.

Black 21. If omitted, White plays 1 to 5 in



Dia. 1

Dia. 2




Figure 1 (1 - 35)

Dia. 2. Black has no answer to the tesuji of 5 so White will be able to settle his group.

White 22. A bold tenuki, considering that his group is a little heavy. Ishida commented that extending to White 23 felt too languid, but perhaps he didn't anticipate the severity of Kobayashi's attack after his tenuki.

Black 25. Attacking with 27 would be a mistake in direction: White gets a strong shape with 28, Black 26, White 'b'.

Black 35. A violent move, one of the highlights of the game. If instead Black hanes at 'c' White counter-hanes at 'd', a standard sabak tesuji; if Black then cuts at 35, White counter-ataris at 'e'.




Figure 2 (36 - 64)


Figure 2 (36 – 64)

White 42, 44. Well-timed forcing moves that prove very useful later.

White 54. A good follow-up forcing move. Black has to compromise with 55, even though that makes White 62 a good move. If 55 at 'a', White squeezes with 55 and 'b' (after making a throw-in at 54), then extends at 61 in sente. In contrast to the game, where White can't really do anything with his two stones (30 and 36), it would be easy for White to pull out his stones.

White 56 spoils all White's good work. If he extended first at 61 (sente), then 56 would work perfectly in sealing Black in. See Dia. 3.

Dia. 3. If White 1 and 3, White blocks Black off from the centre up to 11. He then sets up a ko on the side with 13 to 19, but he has so many ko threats at the bottom that he could consider his group alive.



Dia. 3





Figure 3 (65 – 100)
98: connects

Figure 3 (65 – 100)

White 68. A fatal mistake. Ishida: 'I knew I shouldn't atari here and yet I went ahead and



Dia. 4

ataried.' White should have just connected at 74, that is, 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If White 1, White seals Black in even more effectively than in Dia. 3. This would give him the lead. Black would have to play 2, whereupon White could set up the ko on the right side. In the game, there are defects in White's blockade, so Black is able to split his forces into two. White loses a move.

Black 77. This cut is the result of White's missing his chances with Dias. 3 and 4. When Black extends at 85, White cannot hope to attack him effectively, so he is clearly behind.




Figure 4 (101 – 150)

Ko: 24, 27, 30, 39, 42, 47, 50

Figure 4 (101 – 150)

Black 7. Black lives in sente, which is very painful for White. He has a crack at killing the group with 12 but is unsuccessful. Apparently the vital point for attacking Black was 22 or 29, but even then Black would have lived.

Black 11. Black 16 would be more solid.

White 16. Usually White would invade at 17, but that loses, so he tries to complicate the game by starting a ko.




Figure 5 (151 - 200)

Figure 5 (151 - 200)

White wins the ko with 52, but Black's lead is unaffected.




Figure 6 (201 - 254)

50: connects (left of 30). White connects the ko.

Figure 6 (201 - 254)

Kobayashi made two surprising mistakes in the yose — perhaps he was feeling the strain of the constant round of title matches — so the final result was quite close. First, Black 27 is a hallucination: Black could gain a point by playing at 'a'. Second, Black could have played at 46 at any time, so he lost another point here.

Ishida failed to make use of his chances to

win this game. Black 35 in Figure 1 was probably an overplay; if Ishida had played properly with 56 or 68 in Figure 2, he would have had a good game. Kobayashi commented: 'Perhaps I played too violently. Once I started, I couldn't stop.' Luck was on his side: everything worked out the way he wanted it.

Black wins by 1½ points.

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Ishida Yoshio

Played on 4 December 1985 in Kushiro City, Hokkaido. *Commentary by Kato Masao.*


This was the first title game ever played in the southeastern Hokkaido city of Kushiro. At the welcome party held by the local Nihon Ki-in chapter the night before the game, the players were asked to give speeches. In his, Ishida said: 'I can call myself Tengen until tomorrow night. However, the disciples of the Kitani school are known for their respect for their senior disciples, so I'm sure Kobayashi won't be so inconsiderate as to defeat me three straight.'

Kobayashi's reply: 'Ishida was very helpful to me in the past. I haven't repaid the favour yet, so I must not miss this chance.' In the go world, the term 'repaying a favour' refers to defeating one's teacher: defeating him shows that his instruction has borne fruit. This was doubtless one debt Ishida did not wish to collect.

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 11. An innovation. The usual move is 1 in Dia. 1, after which White attacks Black with 2. The pattern to 9 has been popular in recent years. Ishida hopes to settle the bottom left corner in sente, then to switch to 1 in the diagram.

White 16, which forces 17, is Kobayashi's



Dia. 1




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

counter to Ishida's strategy. If White played the joseki move of 16 at 49 or between 26 and 50, Black would switch to 20.

White 28, 30. Kato was a little unhappy with these moves, as they make it easy for Black: 29 and 31 are virtually automatic. White's position at the top seems a little overconcentrated after 39, but presumably White's aim is to build thickness here to counter Black's thickness on the right side. (Kato's preferences were 'a' for 28 and 39 for 30.)

Black 41 is patient. Kato would attack at 'b', even though that lets White peep at 'c'.

White 46. If at 'd', Black will attack with 'e', White 'f', Black 'b' and take all the right side.

Black 49 surprised Tozawa Akinobu 9-dan, the referee. Tozawa: 'If an amateur played 49, he would be scolded for destroying aji. Ishida must believe that Black 'g', aiming at 50, is not a feasible aim in this game.' Black 47, 49, and 51 in Figure 2 show that Ishida must have been satisfied with his position: he was trying to settle the shape.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 53. Kato maintained that the exchange for 54 was bad for Black, making it harder for him to settle his group on the right after White 62 and 64. He advocated playing 55 to 61 immediately; if then White 64 (after 62-63), Black plays at 54, while if White attacks at 54 Black can extend to 'a'. However, he couldn't convince the players after the game.






Figure 2 (51 - 100)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Ishida claimed that occupying 53 was essential and Kobayashi commented that he would have extended to 77 (forcing Black 'b') before attacking the black group on the right.


Black 65. Ishida seemed unperturbed by the attack. Black 71 does in fact take care of the group. White cannot stop him from getting two eyes after 75.

White 80. The only move if White is going to make a placement. White 1 in Dia. 2 misses the vital point; after 2, White cannot live. If Black tries to kill White after 80, however, he fails, as demonstrated in Dia. 3.

White 82. A strange follow-up to 80. Probably no professional could have predicted this move. The usual continuation after 80 would be to link up as in Dia. 4 (next page) (perhaps after exchanging White 'a' for Black 'b'), but this gives Black a lot of centre territory. In that case, playing in the centre makes sense, but the shape move is White 83 (which Ishida had expected), whereas 82 seems inefficient (this kind of move is known as 'the duffer's kosumi'): it doesn't help 80 and it lets Black take the vital point of 83.

Opinion was divided as to whether 82 was an overplay or a clever move. Judging from what happened it had the desired result for Kobayashi, for it upset the flow of Ishida's game. For a start, Black 83, though undeniably a vital point which creates bad aji in White's position, is too heavy; it lets White start a splitting attack with 92. Black should have played lightly at 92 with 83.

Black 95. A tough decision for Ishida: he can't sacrifice all his stones at the top, but finding the best way to pull them out is far from easy.



Dia. 4

Dia. 5





Figure 3 (101 – 146)

Figure 3 (101 – 146)

Black 1. Connecting up to the right and to the left are miai for Black, so his strategy at the top seems to have succeeded. However, as in the second game, Ishida suddenly lost the thread of his game just when things seemed to be working out for him. Black 3 is the losing move: it doesn't defend against White's cut with 8 and 10. Instead –



Dia. 6

Dia. 5. White should turn at 1. If 2, Black 3 is a good answer. White can cut off three stones, but he makes Black thick, so he doesn't gain anything. In practice, White would switch elsewhere. Kato thought that Black 1 would have given Ishida a good game, though Kobayashi maintained that it would still have been even.

Black 5. Black's last chance to turn at 8. Perhaps Ishida thought that 7 would be sente.

Black 15 is aggressive, but Black doesn't have the strength to back it up. If he had followed Dia. 6, Black would still have had a chance, so 15 is the final losing move. Black 3 in Dia. 6 secures a connection for the centre group, while Black gets a reserve eye at 'a' for the other group, so his chances of saving it would be good.

White 16. Now both groups are cut off.

Black 21–25. Black lives, but every move hurts his centre group.

White 32 is the coup de grace.

Black 33. If at 34, White attaches at 42. Black has no way of saving the group.

Black resigns after White 146.

(Translated by John Power from the Tokyo Shimbun.)



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
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
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